The law of diplomatic asylum:A contextual approach by Behrens, Paul
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The law of diplomatic asylum
Citation for published version:
Behrens, P 2014, 'The law of diplomatic asylum: A contextual approach', Michigan Journal of International
Law, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 101-49.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Michigan Journal of International Law
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Jan. 2020
  
 
 THE LAW OF DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM–A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
Paul Behrens* 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 101 
I. OF BANS AND RESTRICTIONS: DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBIT 
DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM? ................................................................. 107 
II. CHINKS IN THE ARMOR: WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW CALLS FOR 
DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM ................................................................... 111 
A. Deliberate deviations from the ban on asylum ...................... 111 
1. The prevailing practice in Latin America ....................... 112 
2. A right to grant diplomatic asylum under general 
customary law? ............................................................... 115 
B. Rules of international law exercising a permissive impact 
on the situation ...................................................................... 117 
 1.  Erga omnes obligations owed by the receiving state. ....... 118 
 2.  Human rights obligations owed by the sending state. ...... 123 
III. BETWEEN AYES AND NAYS: WHERE THE RIGHT WAY LIES ................ 131 
A. Evaluating the meeting of the norms: a problem of 
methodology ........................................................................... 131 
B. Avoiding the conflict, protecting the interests: The way 
forward .................................................................................. 134 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 146 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 19, 2012, the Ecuadorian embassy to London welcomed an 
unusual guest: the activist Julian Assange sought and was granted asylum on 
mission premises.1 Assange had risen to notoriety as the founder of 
WikiLeaks, the website that had published thousands of classified U.S. 
diplomatic cables2 and documents relating to the armed conflicts in Iraq and 
 
 * Dr. Paul Behrens teaches international law at the School of Law, University of 
Edinburgh. He has previously taught international law at the University of Leicester. E-mail: 
pbehrens@ed.ac.uk. Law and academic opinion have been taken into account until 1 February 
2013. 
 1. Sylvia Hui & Gonzalo Solano, Ecuador Says WikiLeaks Founder Seeking Asylum, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19, 2012. 
 2. David Leigh, How 250,000 US Embassy Cables Were Leaked, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 28, 2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/how-us-embassy-
cables-leaked. For more information on this incident, see Ben Quinn, Patrick Kingsley & 
Jason Rodrigues, WikiLeaks Cables: You Ask, We Search, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2010, 
10:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2010/dec/15/wiki-leaks-you-ask-we-
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Afghanistan.3 But Assange was also wanted for questioning by the 
authorities of Sweden after two women accused him of sexual assault when 
he had visited the country.4 
Assange himself claimed that he had been secretly indicted in the 
United States and was at risk of eventually being extradited to that state.5 In 
that context, the Foreign Minister of Ecuador pointed out that the United 
States still had the death penalty for “espionage and sedition.”6 
The event soon bore all the hallmarks of a major international incident. 
In the course of the summer, the British Foreign Office resorted to strong 
language, stating that Britain was allowed “to take actions in order to arrest 
Mr. Assange in the current premises of the Embassy.”7 Ecuador, on the 
other hand, received support from the Organization of American States 
(OAS), whose foreign ministers approved a resolution supporting the 
“inviolability of diplomatic premises,"8 as well as from the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR), which referred to the “sovereign right of 
States to grant asylum.”9 
In a statement published on the day Assange had been given shelter, the 
Ecuadorian embassy emphasized that its decision should “in no way be 
interpreted as the Government of Ecuador interfering in the judicial 
processes of either the United Kingdom or Sweden.”10 But it is its potential 
for interference that has given diplomatic asylum a certain significance in 
the field of diplomatic relations—to that degree that it provided the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with one of very few opportunities to 
 
search. 
 3. Ecuador Says WikiLeaks Founder Assange Is Seeking Asylum, CNN (June 19, 
2012, 8:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/19/world/europe/ecuador-assange-asylum/. 
 4. Hui & Solano, supra note 1; Ecuador Says WikiLeaks Founder Seeking Asylum, 
supra note 3. 
 5. Jill Lawless, UK: Assange Is Beyond Our Reach In Ecuador Embassy, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2012. 
 6. Hui & Solano, supra note 1. 
 7. Richard Alleyne, WikiLeaks: Julian Assange Will Take Britain to the ‘World 
Court’, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2012, 11:55 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9482433/Wikileaks-Julian-Assange-will-take-
Britain-to-the-World-Court.html (illustrating Britain’s reference to domestic law, i.e., the 
Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987). 
 8. Julian Assange: OAS Partially Supports Ecuador, INDIA BLOOMS NEWS SERVICE, 
Aug. 25, 2012. 
 9. Unasur Backs Ecuador’s Asylum Offer to Assange, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 
20, 2012, 11:59:45 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-
08/20/c_131795981.htm. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas likewise expressed 
support for Ecuador. Id. For the UNASUR statement, see UNASUR Supports the Sovereign 
Right of States to Grant Asylum, GOBIERNO BOLIVARIANO DE VENEZUELA (Aug. 20, 2012, 
8:27 PM), 
http://guyana.embajada.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=628%3Aun
asur-respalda-el-derecho-soberano-de-los-estados-de-conceder-asilo-&catid=3%3Anoticias-
de-venezuela-en-el-mundo&Itemid=19&lang=en. 
 10. Statement, Embassy of Ecuador in London, Statement on Julian Assange (June 19, 
2012), available at http://www.ecuadorembassyuk.org.uk/news/statement-on-julian-assange. 
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discuss interference by diplomatic missions. In the Asylum Case, the 
Colombian Embassy in Lima had provided refuge to the Peruvian politician 
Victor Haya de la Torre, in January 1949. While the court was primarily 
concerned with specific asylum rules recognized in Latin America,11 it also 
had the opportunity to refer to the grant of diplomatic asylum in general and 
held it to be “an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the 
competence of that State.”12 
Nor would it be appropriate to consider such intervention a “mere” 
question of morality or courteoisie. In 1957 when the International Law 
Commission (ILC) debated its draft code on “Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities”—the basis for the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (VCDR)13—it decided to include an Article on duties of 
diplomatic agents and made express reference to their obligation to refrain 
from interference.14 This Article, with minor modifications, was accepted at 
the Diplomatic Conference at Vienna in April 1961 and today forms the 
second sentence of Article 41(1) VCDR.15 In so doing, state parties made it 
clear that they considered conduct of this kind not only a violation of good 
practices, but also a violation of international law; and there is further 
evidence that they jealously guard the rights that the rule seeks to protect.16 
If a receiving state believes that such conduct has occurred, the 
consequences can be severe: in recent years, allegations of interference have 
led to warnings, expulsions, and even to the total severance of diplomatic 
ties.17 
 
 11. See infra, Part II.A.1.  
 12. Asylum Case (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 275 (Nov. 20). 
 13. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]. 
 14. For the original wording of the rule, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 9th Sess., 
Apr. 23–June 28, 1957, reprinted in [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 143, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1957/ [hereinafter 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957)]. 
 15. United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Vienna, 
Austria, Mar. 2–Apr. 14, 1961, UN Doc. A.CONF.20/14/Add.1, at 87. 
 16. Charges of interference have been raised in a wide variety of fields. See, e.g., Karl 
E. Meyer, The Editorial Notebook; The Diplomat's Tightrope, N. Y. TIMES, July 26, 1988, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/26/opinion/the-editorial-notebook-the-
diplomat-s-tightrope.html (the case of the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden, 
who in 1946 delivered 'pointedly partisan speeches' during elections in that country); 
Alexander MacLeod, British Hang On in Tug of War over Canada's Constitution, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1981, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0213/021356.html/%28page%29/3 (the case of the British 
High Commissioner to Canada, Sir John Ford, who was accused of interference over an 
attempt at lobbying two members of the Canadian New Democratic Party); Soviet 
Ambassador Expelled, NZHISTORY.NET (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/page/soviet-ambassador-expelled (the case of the Soviet 
Ambassador to New Zealand, who in 1980 was expelled for allegedly giving money to a pro-
Soviet party in the receiving state). 
 17. This happened, for example, in relations between Nauru and Taiwan in 2002. Ko 
Shu-Ling, Paraguay Reaffirms Relations with Taiwan, TAIPEI TIMES Aug. 20, 2002, at 3, 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/08/20/0000164880. This 
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Among the various fields of potential interference, the grant of asylum 
on diplomatic premises occupies a special position. Unlike, for instance, 
lobbying activities, its impact is direct—especially if the receiving state 
intended to exercise jurisdiction over the person who was seeking asylum 
and who has now been withdrawn from its reach. Granting diplomatic 
asylum is an act that usually generates strong publicity and forces a reaction 
by the receiving state. It is also a phenomenon that has been the bane of 
receiving states throughout diplomatic history; with some commentators 
tracing its roots to the beginnings of permanent diplomacy more than 500 
years ago.18 Among those to whom diplomatic asylum was granted, are 
illustrious names—in 1961, the former Cuban President Manuel Urrutia 
sought asylum in the Venezuelan embassy (in the disguise of a milkman),19 
and in 1992, the former Peruvian President García found refuge in a 
building of the Colombian embassy in that country.20 In 1956, one of the 
most celebrated cases of diplomatic asylum occurred when the U.S. 
embassy in Budapest granted asylum to the Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty. 
The cardinal was to stay in the embassy for nearly fifteen years.21 
But in spite of the prominence, which the phenomenon of diplomatic 
asylum had attained over the years, the VCDR does not expressly mention 
it. Early in the codification history, Columbia suggested in the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly that the ILC’s work should also extend 
to this question.22 But that suggestion was not successful; most Committee 
members held the view that this was a separate topic23 that could more 
appropriately be considered under the “general question of asylum.”24 
For a topic they were not supposed to discuss, the ILC spent a 
 
option has also been discussed by commentators on the Assange case. See Carl Gardner, 
Julian Assange: Can Ecuador’s Embassy be Stripped of its Diplomatic Status?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:14 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/16/julian-assange-diplomatic-status-
ecuador-embassy. 
18. Susanne Riveles, Diplomatic Asylum as a Human Right: The Case of the Durban Six, 11 
HUM. RTS. Q. 139, 144 (1989). For an early case of diplomatic asylum, see U.N. General 
Assembly, Question of Diplomatic Asylum: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/10139 (Part II) (Sept. 22, 1975) [hereinafter Sec-Gen Report (2)]. 
 19. Alfred G. Cuzán, Fidel Castro: A Machiavellian Prince?, 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 
178, 185 (1999), available at 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume9/pdfs/cuzan.pdf. 
 20. Ex-Peruvian President Garcia Arrives in Colombia for Asylum, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 
1992, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-03/news/mn-661_1_peruvian-president-
alan-garcia. 
 21. Dan Balz, A Lengthy Stay for 2 Chinese Dissidents?, WASH. POST, June 13, 1989, 
at A25; Leslie C. Green, Trends in the Law Concerning Diplomats, 19 CANADIAN Y.B. INT’L 
L. 132, 144 (1981); Alex Last, Fifteen Years Holed Up in an Embassy, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19470470 (last updated Sept. 5, 2012, 7:05 PM). 
 22. Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities: Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat, 
[1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 131, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1. 
 23. Id. See also 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957), supra note 14, at 2, ¶ 7.  
 24. 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957), supra note 14 at 2, ¶ 7 (paraphrasing by 
Sandström). 
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surprising amount of time on it,25 with one member, Fitzmaurice, going so 
far as to suggest the inclusion of an article to prohibit the granting of shelter 
on mission premises to persons charged with offenses under local law.26 
Fitzmaurice was not successful in that endeavor, but it is clear that the 
members of the Commission were aware that omitting such an important 
issue would create a gap in their work.27 A little defiant mention of asylum 
made its way into the commentary to the draft articles, but it did not contain 
any significant elaboration on its concept or its implications for diplomatic 
interference.28 
The United Nations revisited the topic of diplomatic asylum in 1974, 
during a debate in the Sixth Committee.29 Following these discussions, the 
General Assembly invited member states to submit their opinions on the 
issue to the Secretary-General and requested the latter to prepare a report 
before the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.30 
The two-part report was published on September 22, 1975.31 It ran  
nearly 100,000 words, and it provided a detailed reflection on the 
development and the concept of diplomatic asylum. But it was as far as the 
United Nations was ever able to go in its effort to elaborate on the subject. 
On December 15, 1975, the General Assembly resolved to give further 
consideration to this topic “at a future session.”32 But to this date, no 
universal convention on diplomatic asylum has come into existence, nor has 
there even been a set of ILC draft articles on this matter. The views 
expressed by U.N. member states in the 1970s, certainly attested to a 
significant differing of opinion on diplomatic asylum; and some authors 
have suspected that states in general felt that the time had not been “ripe” 
for the codification of this subject.33 
That, however, means that diplomatic asylum, at least where general 
international law is concerned, remains an ill-defined concept whose 
boundaries are anything but certain. On that level, the notion of diplomatic 
asylum, as well as its legal assessment—including the very question of 
 
 25. See id. at 54–58, 220–21. 
 26. Fitzmaurice’s article envisaged certain exceptions: in cases in which shelter was 
necessary to “save life or prevent grave physical injury in the face of an immediate threat or 
emergency,” or where such shelter was recognized “by any established local usage,” and 
where the offences were political in nature. Id. at 54, ¶ 33. 
 27. See id. at 55, ¶¶ 45, 50; at 56, ¶¶ 59, 62. 
 28. In the context of Draft Article 40, the ILC referred to certain special agreements, 
which contain rules on the granting of asylum. Documents of the Tenth Session, [1958] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 104, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1958/Add.1 [hereinafter 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n (1958)]. See also infra Part II.A.1. 
 29. U.N. General Assembly, Question of Diplomatic Asylum: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/10139 (Part I) (Sept. 2, 1975), ¶ 2 [hereinafter Sec-Gen Report (1)].  
 30. G.A. Res. 3321 (XXIX), at 148, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3321 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 31. See Sec-Gen Report (1), supra note 29; Sec-Gen Report (2), supra note 18.  
 32. G.A. Res. 3497 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3497 (Dec. 15, 1975). 
 33. Anthea J. Jeffery, Diplomatic Asylum: Its Problems and Potential as a Means of 
Protecting Human Rights, 1 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 10, 16 (1985). 
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whether the grant of asylum constitutes a form of interference—is left to 
customary international law, the determination of which is, in this context, 
fraught with doubt. 
This Article deals with the status that the grant of diplomatic asylum 
enjoys under international law. Essential to this analysis is an exploration of 
the rules that protect the interests of the receiving state and thus carry a 
negative impact on the assessment of a diplomatic decision to this effect. 
That includes the ban on interference itself but also includes other restrictive 
rules that the VCDR codified in the interests of the receiving state. 
These restrictive norms are, however, not the only provisions that apply 
in a situation of diplomatic asylum. The fact is too often ignored that the 
sending state may also pursue legitimate interests by adopting the relevant 
decision, and there may be powerful grounds on which these interests can be 
based. That includes the possible existence of obligations that the receiving 
state owes erga omnes, but also the presence of obligations that the sending 
state may face under specific human rights regimes and that may compel it 
to take protective action when these rights have come under threat. 
A diplomatic mission that finds itself in a situation of this kind will 
therefore be faced with two sets of divergent rules without the availability of 
a fast and easy formula that allows a decision on this question in all 
circumstances. The problem cannot be solved by subordinating one system 
to the other—for instance, by stating that the ban on interference always has 
to win out against obligations to secure human rights.34 What is needed, is a 
contextual view that acknowledges the values and interests that gave rise to 
the divergent norms and that reaches a decision by identifying their 
respective weight in light of the impact that the adoption or omission of the 
diplomatic measure creates. 
The subsequent Sections will identify these divergent norms and will 
present methods to resolve their co-existence. This examination is primarily 
concerned with diplomatic asylum in the narrow sense: the focus is 
therefore not on consular asylum, which is subject to a different regime.35 
However, incidents involving consular asylum are included as illustrations, 
where they share common ground with their counterpart in diplomatic law. 
This Article will deal with the conduct of diplomatic missions and their 
agents; it will primarily address the question of whether they are entitled to 
grant asylum on diplomatic premises. That is not the same as the question 
whether a refugee may be entitled to asylum on mission premises—the 
individual asylum seeker may be subject to a different set of norms. 
The term “refugee” in this Article is employed to denote a person 
seeking diplomatic asylum and is limited to that context. It is thus used 
without prejudice to the question of whether that person, in the 
 
 34. Although such approaches have been suggested in the past, see infra, Part III. A. 
 35. For the rule of non-interference, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 
55(1), April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. For the ban on the use of the 
premises of the consular mission in any manner incompatible with the exercise of consular 
functions, see id., art. 55(2). 
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circumstances of the given case, meets the relevant definitions that refugee 
law adopts for that term.36 
Finally, it is worth recalling one of the basic tenets of diplomatic law: 
diplomatic immunities exist independent of the fulfillment of diplomatic 
duties.37 Even a negative assessment of the lawfulness of the grant of 
asylum can therefore not limit immunities due to the diplomatic mission 
under the VCDR, and it could not possibly constitute a justification for 
receiving states wishing to resort to violations of the Convention in order to 
obtain custody of the asylum seeker.38 
I. OF BANS AND RESTRICTIONS: DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBIT 
DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM? 
While no article of the VCDR deals specifically with diplomatic 
asylum, the Convention does contain two norms in particular that have a 
direct and prima facie limiting effect on this practice. The first of them is 
the ban on interference itself; that norm is enshrined in the general provision 
on duties of diplomatic agents (Article 41(1) VCDR), which reads: 
“Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all 
persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of that State.”39 
But the VCDR does not offer any clarification on the concept of 
interference,40 and it certainly does not dwell on the question of whether 
sheltering refugees on mission premises falls within its scope. The ICJ, too, 
has not been able to provide a detailed examination of this phenomenon. In 
the Asylum Case mentioned above, the court did not offer objective 
 
 36. For an overview of the relevant definitions which have been employed in this field 
of law, see Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 243; UNHCR Handbook, Global Human Rights Education Association, 
http://www.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/intro.htm. 
 37. For an early discussion of this principle, see the comments of ILC member Padilla 
Nervo in 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957), supra note 14, at 143, ¶ 56. Other members of the 
ILC expressly supported his position. See id. at 148, ¶¶ 24, 30. 
 38. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(Hostages Case) (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 40, ¶ 86 (May 24), in which the court found that 
the rules of diplomatic law “constitute a self-contained régime” and declared that the sanctions 
that the VCDR itself puts at the disposal of the receiving state for the abuse of immunities 
“are, by their nature, entirely efficacious.” 
 39. VCDR, supra note 13, art. 41(1). 
 40. The Convention is in that regard more general than some of the historical draft 
codes on diplomatic law, which sometimes provided examples for the conduct of interference. 
See, e.g., PASQUALE FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED AND ITS LEGAL SANCTION OR 
THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES (E.M. Borchard trans., 1918) (1890), 
reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 153, 160, ¶ 482 (Supp. 1932); International Law Association, 
Report of the Thirty-Fourth Conference, Vienna, Austria, 1926, Proposed Codification of the 
Law Regarding the Representation of States (1926) (by Lord Phillimore) [Phillimore’s Draft 
Code], reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 177, 180, ¶ 34 (Supp. 1932). 
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parameters for its rather general view that asylum is a form of 
“intervention.” All the same, the finding must count as one of the most 
explicit considerations of diplomatic interference by the ICJ.41 The ICJ’s 
next opportunity came only thirty years later in the Tehran Hostages Case, 
in which it merely listed interference among the “abuses of [diplomatic] 
functions”42 and acknowledged that it was difficult to determine exactly 
when the diplomatic function of observation would involve acts such as 
espionage or interference.43 
Among writers on diplomatic law, opinions about scope and boundaries 
of interference vary widely. At different times, the concept has been held to 
embrace the “[r]endering of aid or active assistance . . . in favour of a party 
in the national elections,”44 the organization of a secret police and the 
kidnapping of dissidents who live in the receiving state,45 espionage,46 and 
even the assassination of opponents and involvement in the preparation of 
terrorist acts.47 
Both the wording of the VCDR and a consideration of its travaux 
préparatoires allow for only one clear restriction to the concept of 
interference: as opposed to previous treaties in diplomatic law,48 the ban of 
interference under the Vienna Convention does not extend to the foreign 
affairs of the receiving state,49 though it may be difficult to carry the 
distinction between “internal” and “external” affairs into practice. 
The concept of interference that emerges from these considerations, 
remains broad; it is best understood as behavior adopted by a beneficiary of 
diplomatic privileges and immunities that introduces an outside element into 
the internal matters of the receiving state, and by so doing, causes a 
disturbance. The grant of diplomatic asylum would certainly fall within that 
perimeter; the alien element in this context is formed by the limited 
imposition of jurisdiction of the sending state on the territory of the 
receiving state. But a comprehensive view of diplomatic interference will 
also have to take into account the potential existence of justifications; a 
 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 42. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. 38, ¶ 84. 
 43. Id. ¶ 85. In 2009, a case that reached the court involved questions both of 
interference and diplomatic asylum. See Application Instituting Proceedings by the Republic 
of Honduras Against the Federative Republic of Brazil (Honduras Application) (Hond. v. 
Braz.), ¶ 5 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/147/15935.pdf. 
However, the case was withdrawn by the State of Honduras before it reached decision stage. 
See infra text accompanying note 259. 
 44. BISWANATH SEN, A DIPLOMAT’S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 90 (1988). 
 45. 4 CHARLES ROUSSEAU, LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 167 (1980).  
 46. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1068 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).  
 47. Id. at 1068−69. 
 48. See Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers art. 12, Feb. 20, 1928, 155 L.N.T.S. 
259. 
 49. See 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957), supra note 14, at 145, ¶ 76.  
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valid assessment of the underlying diplomatic behavior can only emerge 
through the application of a mechanism that resolves the divergence 
between norms that justify and norms that prohibit the relevant conduct.50 
The duty of non-interference is joined by a second norm that can claim 
applicability in cases of diplomatic asylum: Article 41(3) of the VCDR 
specifically addresses the use of mission premises and imposes further 
obligations on diplomatic agents. It reads: “The premises of the mission 
must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the 
mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general 
international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending 
and the receiving State.”51 
It is in connection with this article that the ILC availed itself of a rare 
opportunity to mention asylum: in the commentary to the text, the 
Commission noted that “among the agreements referred to in paragraph 3 
there are certain treaties governing the right to grant asylum in mission 
premises.”52 Treaties of this kind have come into existence on a regional 
level—most prominently, in the Latin American region (an issue to which 
this examination will return).53 
The commentary by itself does not provide clarification on the position 
taken by international law on the granting of diplomatic asylum. In fact, the 
very question whether such an act would be encompassed by the “functions 
of the mission” has proven to be a challenging issue. 
VCDR Article 3(1) provides a list of five functions, which, to a 
significant degree, emanate from customary international law.54 But that list, 
which refers to the tasks of representation, protection of interests of the 
sending state and its nationals, negotiation, observation, and the promotion 
of friendly relations, does not expressly address the case of diplomatic 
asylum.55 On the other hand, the list is open-ended, and the wording of 
paragraph one makes it clear that the enumerated tasks were included as 
examples only.56 
Yet the acceptance of an additional function with applicability for the 
international community as a whole, would need to fulfill all the 
requirements of a rule of general customary law, including consistency and 
generality of state practice as well as the existence of opinio juris. Such 
 
 50. On the co-existence of divergent interests and its assessment in international law, 
see infra Parts II, III. 
 51. VCDR, supra note 13, art. 41(3).  
 52. 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1958), supra note 28, at 104, art. 40, commentary, ¶ 4. 
 53. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 54. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 35 (2008).  
 55. It is, under specific circumstances, possible that a mission can rely on these 
“traditional” functions when offering asylum to a refugee. For instance, the protection of 
interests of nationals of the sending State may be involved if the receiving State proposed to 
exercise jurisdiction over this group of persons. See VCDR, supra note 13, art. 3(1)(b). 
 56. The article begins with the words: “The functions of a diplomatic mission consist 
inter alia in . . . .” VCDR, supra note 13, art. 3(1) (emphasis in original). 
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evidence is difficult to adduce, at least with regard to the claim that the grant 
of diplomatic asylum in general, and without any further qualifications, is to 
be accepted as a sui generis diplomatic task. Opinions on this matter have 
traditionally shown a wide degree of variation. 
The U.S. State Department emphasized as early as 1930 that the 
“affording of asylum is not within the purposes of a diplomatic mission.”57 
ILC Member Scelle, by contrast, talked during the 1957 round of the 
Commission’s debates about the granting of asylum as “an essential, 
traditional, and, in his opinion, praiseworthy, function of missions.”58 Where 
state practice is concerned, the fact remains that several states have 
consistently voiced opposition to the institution of diplomatic asylum, 
including members of the international community who have been 
particularly active in the field of diplomatic relations.59 
But it is this prevailing disagreement on the evaluation of diplomatic 
asylum that has led some authors to conclude that it is simply not possible to 
derive a positive assessment from the rules of international law on that 
issue. Anthea Jeffery thus speaks of a “grey area” of international law and 
states that there is neither a “recognized right” of asylum, nor an “express 
prohibition against it.”60 
That however, is a simplification of the matter. It is an opinion that is 
based on the premise that the absence of precise rules on a topic of 
international law points to the existence of a vacuum. What it fails to take 
into account is that there might be more general norms and principles that 
may have an impact on the granting of asylum without having been 
specifically designed to address the situation in question. In the Asylum 
Case,61 the ICJ made reference to the most pertinent of these principles 
when it understood the grant of diplomatic asylum as a decision which 
derogated from the “territorial sovereignty” of the receiving state.62 But this 
line of reasoning has also come under attack; Australia, in her submission to 
the Secretary-General pursuant to the 1974 General Assembly Resolution, 
pointed out that concerns about derogations from sovereignty could be 
raised “against every evolving rule of customary international law and 
against every treaty commitment,” as each of these constituted a restriction 
of the powers of the state.63 
 
 57. Richard L. Fruchtermann, Asylum: Theory and Practice, 26 JAG J. 169, 174 (1972) 
(quoting Instructions from Dep’t of State to American Diplomatic Officers in Latin America 
(Oct. 2, 1930)). 
 58. 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1957), supra note 14, at 221, ¶ 90. In his statement, Scelle 
did not differentiate between the general practice of granting asylum and the practice 
prevailing in Latin America. Id.  
 59. On the views of the Soviet Union in that regard, see Riveles, supra note 18, at 157. 
For a discussion regarding other States’ views in this regard, see Jeffery, supra note 33, at 16. 
 60. Jeffery, supra note 33, at 28. 
 61. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 62. Asylum Case (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274−75 (Nov. 20). 
 63. Sec-Gen Report (1), supra note 29, ¶ 6, Australia ¶ 8. 
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That may be a valid observation, but if states restrict their sovereignty 
through treaties or customary law, they do so with the awareness that they 
are creating or adhering to a legally binding rule. The same considerations 
apply to the right of territorial jurisdiction as an emanation of sovereignty; if 
the claim is made that this right has to receive a restrictive interpretation 
because diplomatic asylum has made an inroad into its scope, strong 
evidence is required to bolster this assertion. 
In that regard, however, the observations outlined above apply. The fact 
remains that it is difficult to show agreement within the international 
community to the effect that such an inroad has been accepted, at least 
where an absolute and unqualified right to grant diplomatic asylum is 
concerned. Such a limitation would be tantamount to declaring that 
diplomatic premises are the territory of another state, and that is exactly not 
the route that diplomatic law has taken; under its modern understanding, 
mission premises are still considered territory of the receiving state.64 
To that degree, therefore, the view of the ICJ still carries validity; the 
grant of asylum constitutes, at least prima facie, “intervention” in matters of 
the receiving state. In that context, articles 41(3) and 41(1) of the VCDR 
appear as norms that support the general principle on which the findings of 
the court were based: the jurisdiction of the receiving state as an emanation 
of its rights as a sovereign member of the international community. 
Whether customary law embraces a grant of asylum under more 
particular circumstances—for instance, when humanitarian concerns are at 
issue—is a different question and one that will be discussed in the following 
Section. But it is also possible that international law recognizes norms that, 
while not specifically constructed to deal with the issue of asylum, may 
have an impact on situations in which shelter has been provided on 
diplomatic premises. The existence of rules of this kind may introduce a 
new perspective to the evaluation of the underlying diplomatic conduct and 
thus requires further examination.65 But the basic premise that the 
consideration of the restrictive norms yields, is the fact that the receiving 
state’s right to territorial jurisdiction retains its prominent place in general 
international law, and that diplomatic asylum, in the absence of justifying 
circumstances, constitutes a breach of that right. 
II. CHINKS IN THE ARMOR: WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW CALLS FOR 
DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM 
A. Deliberate deviations from the ban on asylum 
The protection that territorial jurisdiction enjoys under general 
customary law does not prevent individual states from choosing a more 
 
 64. See DENZA, supra note 54, at 15; 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1958), supra note 28, at 
94−95, art. 18, commentary, ¶ 3. 
 65. See infra Part II.B. 
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restrictive concept of jurisdiction in their mutual relations. Jurisdiction is a 
right and not a duty, and states are therefore free to forego its exercise where 
the practice of diplomatic asylum is concerned. Evidence for a decision of 
this kind can derive from specific treaties, but also from customary law if, in 
specific situations, it accords diplomatic asylum treatment that allows for a 
derogation from the sovereignty of the receiving state. 
Both options have played a role in state practice and academic debate 
on diplomatic asylum. What they have in common is the fact that they do 
not establish a general exception to the jurisdiction of the territorial state 
that would apply regardless of the circumstances of the case. They rather 
constitute concepts whose existence, if accepted, would lead to a 
justification if specific parameters apply. Two options of this kind require 
closer analysis: the practice of asylum as adopted in Latin America and the 
possibility of the existence of a limited right to diplomatic asylum under 
customary law. 
1. The prevailing practice in Latin America 
Latin American states have traditionally allocated a more significant 
position to diplomatic asylum than that existing in other regions of the 
world. However, even in this area, the existence of a rule of customary law 
allowing for shelter on mission premises, has been doubted.66 Jeffery for 
instance expressed the view that opinio juris as a required element of 
customary law is missing, and bases this view on the ICJ judgment in the 
Asylum Case.67 
That, however, appears to be a misreading of the court’s opinion. The 
main concern of the ICJ in that regard was not the existence of the principle 
of diplomatic asylum in local customary law, but the much narrower 
question of whether the State granting asylum can unilaterally determine the 
nature of the offense of which the person seeking asylum is accused.68 
And the nature of the offense matters; it does not appear that Latin 
American practice allows for the granting of asylum in cases where the 
refugee seeks to escape the exercise of territorial jurisdiction for “common” 
(as opposed to political) offenses.69 If however the alleged offense of the 
asylum seeker is political in nature, the prevailing evidence suggests that 
Latin American states do accept a right to grant asylum on embassy 
premises. The basis for this is not only constituted by numerous examples of 
state practice (in the 1974 debates of the 6th Committee, Colombia pointed 
out that three of her presidents owed their lives to the grant of diplomatic 
 
 66. See S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1971). 
 67. Jeffery, supra note 33, at 14. 
 68. See Asylum Case (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 273 (Nov. 20). 
 69. This at any rate is the way in which the practice has been reflected in various 
treaties on diplomatic asylum that were concluded by American states. See infra text 
accompanying note 80. 
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asylum)70 and corroborated by the views of expert commentators on this 
subject,71 but it also derives support from the text of subsequent treaties, 
which codified the relevant norm of customary law. 
While these treaties took the general principle of asylum in Latin 
America as their starting point, they were also able to address questions on 
which customary law had not been able to provide a satisfactory degree of 
clarity (including the above mentioned issue of the determination of the 
nature of the offence).72 Given their detail and comprehensiveness, they are 
the most sophisticated instruments on diplomatic asylum that have yet 
emerged in international law with effect for a multitude of states. 
Treaties of this kind go back to the 19th century; the 1889 Montevideo 
Treaty on International Penal Law already addressed the right to grant 
asylum on premises of the diplomatic mission.73 The following fifty years 
saw the conclusion of three treaties that gained particular importance for the 
regulation of diplomatic asylum in the Latin American region: the Havana 
Convention on Asylum of 1928;74 the Montevideo Convention on Political 
Asylum of 1933;75 and the Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and 
 
 70. Jeffery, supra note 33, at 23. See also Cuzán supra note 19, at 185 (discussing the 
1961 case of Manuel Urrutia); Jonathan Kandell, Argentines Given Embassy Refuge, N. Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1974, at 13 (the 1974 case of Dr. Rodolfo Puiggros, a university rector and 
member of the Peronist left, granted asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Argentina); John 
Reichertz, Peronist Holds Latin American Record for Asylum, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 3, 
1981 (the 1976 case of Juan Abal Medina, a Peronist politician, granted asylum in the 
Mexican Embassy in Argentina); John Enders, Official Accused Of Drug Trafficking Removed 
As Military Academy Head, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 30, 1981 (the 1981 case of Hugo 
Cespedes, former Defence Minister of Bolivia, who sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy 
in Bolivia); Oswaldo Bonilla, Sandinista Military Doctor Requests Political Asylum, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L, Nov. 30, 1985 (the 1985 case of Lt. Roberto Granera, a military doctor who was 
apparently disappointed with the Sandinista regime, and requested asylum in the Venezuelan 
embassy in Nicaragua); Former Noriega Associates Allowed to Leave Country, UNITED PRESS 
INT’L, May 11, 1991 (the 1990 case of Luis Gomez, a former Panamanian legislator, granted 
asylum in the Cuban embassy in Panama); Ecuador’s Gutierrez Makes First Statements Since 
Taking Shelter in Embassy, BBC MONITORING AMERICAS, Apr. 23, 2005, available at 
ProQuest, Doc. ID. 460229523 (the 2005 case of Lucio Gutierrez, former president of 
Ecuador, granted asylum in the Brazilian embassy in Quito).  
 71. See Sec-Gen Report (2), supra note 18, ¶¶ 15, 35. See also 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
(1957), supra note 14, at 220−21, ¶¶ 82, 83, 87, 93 (contributions of various members of the 
International Law Commission who, arguably with the Latin American context in mind, 
emphasized that a right to grant asylum was not necessarily dependent upon the existence of a 
treaty to that effect). 
 72. Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277. For an illustration of the regulation in 
contemporary law, see infra note 78, art IV.  
 73. Treaty on International Penal Law art. 17, Jan. 23, 1889, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3781c.html [hereinafter Montevideo Treaty on 
International Penal Law]. 
 74. Convention on Asylum, Feb. 20, 1928, 132 L.N.T.S 323 [hereinafter Havana 
Convention on Asylum]. 
 75. Convention on Political Asylum, Dec. 26, 1933, reprinted in 6 MARJORIE M. 
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435−36 (1968) [hereinafter Montevideo 
Convention on Political Asylum]. 
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Refuge of 1939.76 
In the wake of the Asylum Case, another initiative for the codification of 
diplomatic asylum was launched,77 which resulted in the signing, in March 
1954, of the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (the “Caracas 
Convention”), to which fourteen American states have become party.78 
Recurring themes in these conventions are: the limitation of the right to 
asylum to persons charged with political offenses,79 the express exclusion 
from the remit of asylum of persons accused of “common offenses,”80 the 
duty to notify the territorial state of the grant of asylum,81 and the right to 
require safe exit for the refugee.82 Some of the conventions recognize that a 
danger of interference may also be created by allowing the asylum seeker to 
carry out certain acts on mission premises83 and therefore contain rules 
limiting the conduct that the refugee is allowed to adopt.84 
However, once the conditions for diplomatic asylum under these 
 
 76. Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge, Aug. 4, 1939, reprinted in WHITEMAN, 
supra note 75, at 432–34 [hereinafter Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge]. 
 77. On the codification history of the Caracas Convention, see Sec-Gen Report (2), 
supra note 18, ¶¶ 74–79.  
 78. Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, March 28, 1954, 1438 U.N.T.S. 101, available 
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-46.html [hereinafter Caracas Convention]. 
 79. Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, supra note 75, arts. 2−3; Havana 
Convention on Asylum, supra note 74, art. 2; Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law, 
supra note 73. The Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge contained somewhat 
more liberal rules and allowed asylum for “persons pursued for political reasons or offenses, 
or under circumstances involving concurrent political offenses, which do not legally permit of 
extradition.” Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge, supra note 76, art. 2. See 
also the Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum which allowed asylum for “persons being 
sought for political reasons or for political offenses,” Caracas Convention, supra note 78, art. 
1. 
 80. Caracas Convention, supra note 78, art. 3; Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum 
and Refuge, supra note 76, arts. 2−3; Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, supra note 
75, art. 1; Havana Convention on Asylum, supra note 74, art. 1. The Montevideo Treaty on 
International Penal Law states that refugees charged with “non-political” offenses shall be 
surrendered to the local authorities. Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law, supra note 
73, art. 17. 
 81. Caracas Convention, supra note 78, art. 8; Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum 
and Refuge, supra note 76, art. 4; Havana Convention on Asylum, supra note 74, art. 2; 
Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law, supra note 73, art. 17. The Montevideo 
Convention on Political Asylum does not contain a provision on notification. However, the 
treaty cannot be considered in isolation: its declared purpose was to provide a definition of 
“the terms of the one signed at Havana.” Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, supra 
note 75, pmbl. It therefore did not seek to deviate from Article 2 of that convention. 
 82. Caracas Convention, supra note 78, arts. 5, 11-13; Montevideo Treaty on 
International Penal Law, supra note 73 art. 17. See also Montevideo Treaty on Political 
Asylum and Refuge, supra note 76, art. 6; Havana Convention on Asylum, supra note 74, art. 
2. The Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum does not contain an express reference to 
this right, but the considerations outlined supra, note 81, are applicable here as well. 
 83. See infra, text accompanying note 251. 
 84. Caracas Convention, supra note 78, art. 18; Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum 
and Refuge, supra note 76, art. 5; Havana Convention, supra note 74, art. 2. 
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conventions are fulfilled, the territorial state, if it is party to them, is obliged 
to recognize it and is bound by the commitments that the treaties impose. In 
that regard, state parties have agreed to a deviation from general customary 
law: they recognize an exception to the principle of territorial jurisdiction 
under circumstances that they themselves have specified. 
2. A right to grant diplomatic asylum under general customary law? 
From time to time, the claim has been raised that there are other forms 
of asylum on mission premises that may have attained the status of 
customary law. Reference is occasionally made to the granting of asylum in 
cases in which humanitarian concerns for the refugee exist and in which the 
affording of shelter might be limited to the time period in which these 
concerns are present. 85 
Cases of “mob violence”—situations in which the refugee finds himself 
pursued by parts of the population before he reaches the haven of the 
embassy—are prime examples for scenarios of this kind.86 But even in cases 
of this kind, it is difficult to adduce evidence for the claim that a customary 
right to grant asylum exists. As far as the objective aspects of the alleged 
right are concerned, it has to be noted that the practice of asylum in these 
circumstances is hardly generally and consistently applied—there are of 
course numerous cases of mob violence that did not induce diplomatic 
missions to act. 
Nor is it clear that there is opinio juris among the international 
community as to the acceptance of such a right. Some states do appear to 
allow for this exception where their own diplomatic missions are concerned; 
the United States, for one, while generally opposed to a right to asylum, has 
in the past expressed a more generous attitude towards “uninvited fugitives 
whose lives are in imminent danger from mob violence,” as long as the 
danger was still ongoing.87 
General Assembly Resolution 3321, which had invited members of the 
United Nations to express their views on diplomatic asylum,88 had also 
mentioned the “humanitarian” aspects of that matter,89 and several states 
referred to this facet of asylum in their replies.90 But not all of them were 
 
 85. See, e.g., Riveles, supra note 18, at 158 (referring to persons “under threat of life 
and limb”). Fruchtermann, supra note 57, at 170 (referring to persons whose lives are 
endangered “because of unlawful action such as mob violence”). 
 86. One illustration is the 1986 case of Jener Cotin—a former official of the Duvalier 
regime in Haiti, who had been attacked by a mob and found refuge in the Brazilian embassy. 
Associated Press, Ex-Duvalier Police Chief Granted Asylum in Brazil, Feb. 24, 1986; S. 
Beaulieu, Former Duvalier Supporters Said to Flee Haiti, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 
Feb. 24, 1986. 
 87. Fruchtermann, supra note 57, at 174; see also Riveles, supra note 18, at 157 
(regarding the U.S. view on the Mindszenty case). 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 89. G.A. Res. 3321, supra note 30, pmbl., ¶ 2. 
 90. The submissions of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Jamaica, and 
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happy to base a customary right to grant asylum on humanitarian concerns. 
Some states were quite clear in their restrictive interpretation of the law; 
despite the resolution’s reference to humanitarian aspects, they reiterated 
their position that diplomatic asylum, in the absence of special agreements, 
was simply not recognized in international law. That for instance was the 
position by Czechoslovakia, who at the same time pointed out that she was 
“fully aware of the humanitarian aspects of the institution of asylum.”91 
Acceptance of a customary right to grant asylum on humanitarian 
considerations would thus be fraught with difficulties, beginning with the 
very question of whether “humanitarian concerns” are capable of an 
interpretation that yields a sufficient degree of precision to allow the 
assumption of a rule with normative character. The replies to the General 
Assembly Resolution certainly suggest that states harbored widely varying 
ideas of what the “humanitarian aspects” of asylum should encompass.92 
The fact bears observing that even within the Latin American institution 
of diplomatic asylum, reasons of humanity are, by themselves, not sufficient 
to establish a right to give refuge on mission premises. The significant 
feature of diplomatic asylum, as it appears in the relevant treaties, is that the 
persons seeking asylum are accused of political offenses or pursued for 
political reasons.93 If humanitarian reasons had been the decisive factor, 
diplomatic asylum would have been opened to those accused of “common 
offences” as well94—even the common criminal might, after all, be 
threatened with mob violence. 
Humanitarian considerations, it appears, do not easily induce consensus 
on their suitability as a basis for diplomatic asylum. The most that can be 
said, based on the positive statements issued by some states on this matter,95 
is that this is an area of international law that is in development.96 There 
might even be evidence for a nascent norm of customary law, but at present, 
international law does not appear to recognize a right to diplomatic asylum 
based on these considerations alone. 
 
Uruguay are such examples. See Sec-Gen Report (1), supra note 29, ¶ 6. 
 91. Id. Several other states expressed similarly restrictive opinions. See id. (the 
positions of Bahrain and Poland).  
 92. Denmark for instance spoke of exposure to an “imminent physical threat,” Liberia 
would have let “imminent personal danger of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group and political opinion” suffice, Pakistan 
made clear that “imminent danger to life” qualified as a basis for the grant of diplomatic 
asylum, but not “danger to liberty,” and Uruguay talked about a “duty” to grant asylum “for 
reasons based on human rights.” Id.  
 93. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 94. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 96. See also Sec-Gen Report (1), supra note 29 (regarding Pakistan’s reply to General 
Assembly Resolution 3321. Pakistan’s position was that the matter was “essentially de lege 
ferenda”). 
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B. Rules of international law exercising a permissive impact on the situation 
In the absence of a deliberate decision to restrict the reach of 
interference in cases of diplomatic asylum, the possibility cannot be 
discounted that there may be rules of international law which, while not 
specifically constructed to deal with this subject, have an impact on cases of 
this kind. 
Such rules are typically embedded within a wider framework that exists 
largely independently of rules of diplomatic law—norms for example, 
which pertain to a people’s right to self-determination. Identifying the 
existence of rules of this kind is not the same as claiming that a specific 
right to asylum exists under customary law. It merely means that there are 
interests on the side of the sending state that must be considered, but it does 
not yet define the relationship between these interests and the receiving 
state’s interest in the general prohibition of asylum.97 
Such divergent interests are frequently derived from human rights law; 
reference has thus been made to the lives of the refugees that might be in 
danger,98 to their physical integrity,99 to their liberty,100 and to their freedom 
from persecution or discrimination.101 That these interests represent rights of 
the individual refugees cannot be denied.102 But the mere reference to 
human rights does not mean that foreign agents have the duty—or even the 
right—to protect them.103 Indeed, the traditional view on human rights 
 
 97. See infra Part III. 
 98.  R v. Secretary of State (B & Others), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [88], [2005] Q.B. 
643 [88] (appeal taken from Q.B.); U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 6th Comm. at 134 (Australia) and 
138 (Italy), UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1551. See also Green, supra note 21, at 143; Jeffery, supra 
note 33, at 26. 
  99. U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 134 (Australia), UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1551; B and Others, 
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [88]. 
 100. See Jeffery, supra note 33, at 26. 
  101.        U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 6th Comm, 241 (Australia), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1505. 
See also Riveles, supra note 18, at 158. 
 102. For the right to life, see European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter 
ACHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. For the right to physical integrity, see expressis verbis 
ACHR art. 5. Where the ECHR is concerned, the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) 
has read this right into the right to a “private life.” See X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 239, ¶22 (1985); Glass v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 359, 70 
(2004). That right is guaranteed in ECHR art. 8; ICCPR art. 17. For the right to liberty of the 
person, see ECHR art. 5; ACHR art. 7; ICCPR art. 9. For freedom from discrimination, see 
ECHR art. 14; ACHR arts. 1(1), 24; ICCPR arts. 14, 26. 
 103. There are further consequences that the assumption of such a premise would 
generate. The rule of non-interference, as enshrined in VCDR, art. 41, supra note 13, and the 
prohibition of the use of force in U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, must be considered among the 
principal safeguards of the principle of territorial integrity. If it is possible to dispense with the 
applicability of one of these norms because the human rights of individuals have been 
endangered, there is no reason why it should not be possible to dispense with the other as well. 
In the literature, some authors have indeed gone as far as to consider the granting of 
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involvement by diplomatic agents had been restrictive; in 1979, the editors 
of Satow’s Diplomatic Practice still pointed out that heads of missions must 
“on no account” occupy themselves “with the interests of any but the 
subjects or ressortissants . . . of [their] own sovereign or state, and 
especially not with those of the subjects of the local sovereign.”104 While 
that view is not uncontested today,105 it is still not the (threatened) human 
rights violation on its own that triggers a right to act. What is required is a 
clear mandate under international law that allows the state and its agents to 
take action. 
The most prominent example for a situation of this kind arises if the 
matter concerns an obligation that the receiving state owes erga omnes.106 In 
view of rights affected by erga omnes obligations, the ICJ pointed out that 
“all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.”107 While 
many erga omnes rights will therefore affect primarily internal affairs of the 
receiving state, that state is not able to claim that these matters fall 
exclusively within its own domain. If however the underlying matters are 
thus externalized, a possibility for action by the sending state and its agents 
has come into existence.108 
1. Erga omnes obligations owed by the receiving state. 
It is true that reference to erga omnes obligations is typically made 
where human rights in the receiving state are involved. But the human rights 
violations that are considered in this context tend to be very specific. 
Protection from slavery and racial discrimination for instance,109 the 
prohibition of torture,110 and the outlawing of genocide111 have all been 
accepted as norms carrying erga omnes character. Furthermore, given the 
connection between international crimes and serious human rights 
 
diplomatic asylum as a form of a wider alleged right to “humanitarian intervention,” which 
includes the military aspects of that concept. Jeffery, supra note 33, at 24, 26. 
 104. SATOW’S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 450 (Lord Gore-Booth ed., Longman 
Grp. Ltd, 5th ed. 1979).  
 105. For a change in direction, see SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 153 (Ivor Roberts 
ed., Oxford Univ. Pres, 6th ed. 2009). 
 106. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 
33 (Feb. 5). 
 107. Id.  
 108. It is true that the “beneficiaries” of erga omnes obligations will be the states 
themselves, but where states in international relations make use of diplomatic missions as their 
organs, diplomats are able to invoke these rules on their behalf. At the same time, they have to 
observe the limitations that international law imposes on the sending state. See Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 
44, art. 6, commentary, ¶ 4 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter State 
Responsibility Articles] (referring to diplomatic and consular missions as 'State organs'). 
 109. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 34. 
 110. Prosecutor v Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 111. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 34. 
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violations,112 there may be good reason to follow those authorities on 
international criminal law who suggest that the suppression of all 
international crimes should be considered an obligation erga omnes.113 
Of particular importance in the context of diplomatic asylum is the 
concept of self-determination, which finds mention in the Charter of the 
United Nations,114 and whose character as a right has been clarified in 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).115 The ICJ has affirmed in several decisions that 
self-determination carries erga omnes character,116 and that invites the 
possibility that diplomatic agents could rely on it when granting asylum on 
embassy premises. Its particular significance lies in the fact that its 
boundaries are drawn wide: ICCPR and ICESCR refer in this regard to a 
people’s right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”117 Beyond that, it is clear 
that the realization of self-determination presupposes the existence of other 
human rights,118 including not only the “classical” political rights—chief 
among them, the right to vote and to stand in elections,119 but presumably 
also freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression.120 
On the other hand, self-determination is a group right, and its 
beneficiaries are entities that fulfill the criteria of a “people.”121 If 
 
 112. See Prosecutor v Brđanin and Talić, No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion by 
Radoslav Brđanin for Provisional Release, n. 61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 25, 2000). 
 113. See Larissa van den Herik, A Quest for Jurisdiction and an Appropriate Definition 
of Crime: Mpambara Before the Dutch Courts, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1117, 1129 (2009). 
 114. U.N. Charter, supra note 103, art. 1, para. 2 (naming the purposes of the United 
Nations and referring to the objective of developing friendly relations among nations “based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”). 
 115. ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 1(1) (“All peoples have the right of self-
determination”). The same wording appears in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 116. East Timor (Port. v Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30); Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall Opinion), Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 199, ¶¶ 155-56 (July 9). 
 117. ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 115, art. 1(1). 
 118. THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 98 
(1997).  
 119. ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 25; ACHR, supra note 102, art. 23. See also First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 
262 [hereinafter Protocol 1 to ECHR]. For a critical view, see Daniel Thürer, Self-
Determination, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., 364, 367 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).  
 120. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 32 ¶ 55 (Oct. 16); Socialist 
Party and Others v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 24, 24−25, ¶ 45 (1999). 
 121. U.N. Charter, supra note 103, art. 1(2); ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 1(1); 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970), 5th Principle [hereinafter Friendly Relations 
Declaration]. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 281, ¶ 123 (Can.) 
 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:1 
 
diplomatic asylum is therefore granted, because the rights of only a select 
few individuals have come under threat, self-determination could not easily 
be invoked as a basis for that action. There are certain qualifications to that 
rule: it is not uncommon that the receiving state targets individuals precisely 
because of their relevance for the group—the leaders of the group, say, or 
prominent journalists—and that restrictions of their rights then affect the 
exercise of self-determination by the collective. In situations of this kind, 
diplomatic action whose immediate benefits are felt by individuals, can still 
relate to the (threatened) breach of an erga omnes obligation. 
An example is the 2008 case of the Zimbabwean opposition leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai, who in June of that year sought refuge in the embassy 
of the Netherlands in Harare.122 Tsvangirai himself stated that threats to his 
security existed, and these claims were confirmed by third parties.123 But his 
request for shelter followed a campaign of widespread political violence 
against the opposition,124 and there could have been little doubt that a threat 
to the Zimbabwean people’s right to “freely determine their political status” 
existed. The decision by the embassy therefore went beyond the protection 
of the right of one individual; it benefited the people in whose interest the 
right had been established.125 
The decision to offer diplomatic assistance can rely on particularly 
strong grounds if the sending state can invoke not only a right, but also a 
positive duty to act. The identification of such duties in international law 
 
(referring to the definition of “people”); ELIZABETH CHADWICK, SELF-DETERMINATION, 
TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4−5 
(1996).  
 122. Mugabe Rival Takes Refuge in Embassy, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2008, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/24/world/fg-zimbabwe24. 
 123. Troops Hunt for Tsvangirai, MODERN GHANA (June 25, 2008, 3:27 PM), 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/171489/1/troops-hunt-for-tsvangirai.html. 
 124. Mugabe Rival Takes Refuge in Embassy, supra note 122. see also Troops Hunt for 
Tsvangirai, supra note 123. 
 125. A further limitation to the exercise of self-determination is established through the 
fact that the territorial integrity of the receiving State is likewise recognized in international 
law. See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 15; U.N. Charter, supra note 
103, art. 2, para. 4; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act art. 1(a)(I), Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292. A 
distinction is therefore commonly made between the “external” and the “internal” aspects of 
self-determination, and it appears accepted today that (outside the context of colonial or 
foreign oppression) self-determination has to be primarily realized internally, i.e., through a 
people’s pursuit of its “political, economic, social and cultural development.” Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 281, ¶ 126. A right to external self-determination exists only as a last 
resort, if internal self-determination has been denied. Rob Dickinson, Twenty-First Century 
Self-Determination: Implications of the Kosovo Status Settlement for Tibet, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 547, 553 (2009); see Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 281, ¶ 138. External 
self-determination can be realized, for example, through declaration of independence for the 
territory on which the people live, its association with another state or its integration with such 
a State. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 57 (Oct. 16); G.A. Res. 1541 
(XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV), Principle VI (Dec. 15, 1960). In light of the above, a 
decision to grant diplomatic asylum to secessionists can therefore not in all circumstances be 
based on the erga omnes character of the right to self-determination. 
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may be difficult, but the claim has been made that they can exist under 
specific circumstances in the field of diplomatic—and consular—asylum. 
The 1984 case of the “Durban Six” is an example that has been discussed in 
this context.126 
In September 1984, six refugees turned up at the British consulate in 
Durban, South Africa and asked Consul Simon Davey for refuge.127 They 
included activists of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Natal 
Indian Congress (NIC)—organizations that had called for a boycott of 
recent parliamentary elections in South Africa.128 
The South African system of apartheid formed the background to this 
case—the new South African Parliament was envisaged as a body 
containing racially segregated chambers, and the boycott movement was 
intended to cast doubt on the credibility of the elections.129 By the time they 
requested shelter in the consulate, the activists were sought by the security 
police of the receiving state.130 
There were several reasons for the grant of asylum that the consulate 
could have invoked and that enjoyed recognition under international law. 
The non-white population of South Africa was, during the existence of 
apartheid, certainly prevented from exercising its right to internal self-
determination (a right that was expressly recognized by the General 
Assembly for the “peoples of southern Africa”131). The prohibition of racial 
discrimination has likewise been recognized as an obligation erga omnes,132 
and the General Assembly had emphasized that the system of apartheid was 
“necessarily” based on theories of racial discrimination.133 Apartheid also 
constitutes a crime against humanity, if the relevant elements are in place 
that international criminal law requires,134 and its commission therefore 
 
 126. See Riveles, supra note 18, at 158. 
 127. Michael Hornsby & Ray Kennedy, Fugitives Shelter in British Consulate, TIMES 
(London), Sept. 14, 1984, at 1.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Paul Van Slambrouck, South Africa Arrests Key Opponents of Its New Parliament, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 1984, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0822/082219.html.  
 130. Hornsby & Kennedy, supra note 127. 
 131. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/8163 (Nov. 30, 1970). 
 132. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, 
¶¶ 33-34 (Feb. 5). 
 133. G.A. Res. 395 (V), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1548 (Nov. 2, 1950). 
 134. For today’s regulation, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
7(1)(j), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICCSt]; Preparatory 
Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court Part II: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(j), U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Elements of Crime]. Under the Elements 
of Crime, apartheid requires, inter alia, the commission of an inhumane act and a contextual 
element: the conduct must have been “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.” See also International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 1, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against 
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gives rise to erga omnes obligations on this basis as well.135 
Given this confluence of competing interests, it is perhaps not 
surprising that some authors have argued strongly in favor of a right of the 
United Kingdom to provide refuge to the Durban Six—and even for an 
“obligation to grant diplomatic asylum.”136 
And international law has, on occasion, recognized such obligations 
with applicability for all members of the international community. Where 
the ICJ has identified duties of this kind, they tend to be negative in 
character—the duty, for instance, not to recognize a situation arising from 
the commission of an unlawful act.137 But in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, the ICJ went further and found that all States had an 
obligation to “see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction 
of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-
determination [was] brought to an end.”138 In the case of South Africa, it 
was the General Assembly that appealed to governments to “provide every 
assistance . . . to the national movement of the oppressed people of South 
Africa in their legitimate struggle”139 and requested all states to take “more 
effective action” towards the elimination of apartheid.140 
Erga omnes interests can therefore result in positive obligations on the 
part of third states, and the view thus appears justified that the grant of 
diplomatic asylum can, in some situations, be based on a duty incumbent on 
the sending state. 
It is true that the grant of asylum on diplomatic premises goes far 
beyond, for example, the making of verbal representations to alert the 
receiving state or the international community to the breach of erga omnes 
 
Humanity art. I(b), Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3068 (Nov. 30, 1973); G.A. Res. 2671 (XXV), art. F, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/8106(I) 
(Dec. 8, 1970); G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/7342 (Nov. 26, 1968); S.C. 
Res. 556, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/556 (Oct. 23, 1984). 
 135. See supra, text accompanying note 113. 
 136. Riveles, supra note 18, at 158. 
 137. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Namibia 
Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 58, ¶ 133 (June 21) (on the duty to 
refrain from any act implying recognition of the legality of the presence of South Africa in 
Namibia). See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Wall Opinion), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200, ¶ 159 (July 9) 
(referring to a duty “not to recognize the illegal situation” arising from the construction of the 
wall in Palestine, and the duty “not to render aid or assistance” to maintain the arising 
situation). 
 138. Wall Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200, ¶ 159. See also Friendly Relations Declaration, 
supra note 121, G.A. Res. 36/103, Annex, art. 2(III), U.N. Doc. A/Res/36/103/Annex (Dec. 9, 
1981). But see Wall Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 219, ¶ 40 (separate opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans). 
 139. G.A. Res. 2775 (XXVI), F, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/8504 (Nov. 29, 1971). 
 140. Id. ¶ 8. 
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obligations.141 That, however, is a question about the degree of action 
necessary to fulfil the sending state’s obligations, rather than a matter 
relating to the prima facie existence of a need to act. It is, after all, entirely 
possible that the granting of asylum was the only available means to render 
effective assistance to the protected interest—just as it is possible that, under 
certain circumstances, less intrusive means would have been at the disposal 
of that State. These questions will be discussed in more detail in Section III. 
2.  Human rights obligations owed by the sending state 
Another basis for the creation of interests on the side of the sending 
state in cases of diplomatic asylum, is formed by provisions contained in 
human rights treaties to which that state is party. 
It may seem an unusual suggestion that sending states should be 
addressees of human rights obligations in the receiving state; traditionally, it 
is the territorial state that is seen as the guarantor of the rights of its 
inhabitants. But there are cases in which the question has arisen whether 
human rights regimes might not impose obligations on sending states in this 
context as well. A case that reached the English courts in 2003, provides an 
illustration. 
On the morning of July 18, 2002, two little boys—the brothers Alamdar 
and Muntazer Bakhtiari—turned up at the British consulate in Melbourne 
and requested asylum.142 They had arrived in Australia as asylum seekers in 
2001 and had, under the Migration Act of 1958, been put in the Woomera 
Detention Centre.143 Woomera was a camp that the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman had described as a “stark place, lacking warmth or a sense of 
community.”144 Others found more graphic words for it.145 Facilities in the 
centre were in a poor state and provisions for medical care were 
 
 141. The right to make verbal representations if erga omnes obligations of the receiving 
State have been violated appears to be well supported in international law. See State 
Responsibility Articles, supra note 108 at 29, art. 48(2), in conjunction with art. 48(1)(b). 
 142. R v. Secretary of State (B & Others), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [7], [2005] Q.B. 
643 (appeal taken from Q.B.). The case of the Bakthiari family is a cause célèbre in the field 
of asylum and human rights law as relating to that concept. In 2003, the family’s treatment by 
Australian authorities was considered by the Human Rights Committee from a different 
perspective (that is, the question of violations of the ICCPR by Australia). See Human Rights 
Comm., Mr. Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Communication No. 
1069/2002, ¶ 9.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002 (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bakhtiari 
2003]. The transcription of the names varies: in B and Others, the brothers are referred to as 
“Muntazer” and “Alamdar Bakhtiari,” in Bakhtiyari 2003, they were referred to as “Mentazer” 
and “Almadar Bakhtiyari.” For current purposes, the spelling employed by the Court of 
Appeal will be preferred.  
 143. B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [5,7]. 
 144. Id. ¶ 90. 
 145. After visiting Woomera Camp, the leader of the Australian Democrats, Natasha 
Stott Despoja, called it a “hell-hole.” Patrick Barkham, PM Calls Asylum Protest Blackmail: 
Aborigines Throw Their Weight Behind Afghan Hunger Strikers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 
2002, 8:56 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/26/immigration.uk. 
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inadequate.146 According to former Woomera guards, violence was an ever-
present phenomenon;147 riots occurred and were put down with tear gas and 
water cannons.148 There were reports of sexual violence.149 Instances in 
which detainees had harmed themselves were common.150 The two brothers 
themselves had reportedly been exposed to tear gas and water cannons, been 
hit and pushed into razor wire by staff at Woomera, and had on several 
occasions engaged in acts of self-harm.151 They escaped the camp with 
thirty-three other detainees around June 29, 2002.152 
After the boys had reached the British consulate, a decision was made 
to bring them into the office area of the premises, while the Vice-Consul and 
the Deputy High Commissioner tried to obtain instructions from their 
superiors.153 The advice eventually received from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was that grounds to consider a request for asylum 
existed only in the country of first asylum.154 The Deputy High 
Commissioner explained to the boys that they would not be allowed to 
remain in the consulate, and the brothers then left on their own accord.155 
Following these incidents, the brothers, through representatives, sought 
judicial review of the decision to deny them asylum and expel them from 
the premises of the consulate. When the case reached the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, part of the court’s considerations turned on issues of 
human rights law; it was the contention of the claimants that there had been 
a threat to their rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR, freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment and 
the right to liberty and security, respectively).156 
The fact that diplomatic and consular premises are located in the 
territory of the receiving state is not in itself a bar to the applicability of 
 
 146.  Four Corners: . . .About Woomera (Australian Broadcasting Corp. television 
broadcast May 19, 2003), transcript available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s858341.htm. 
 147. Four Corners: The Guards’ Story (Australian Broadcasting Corp. television 
broadcast Sept. 15, 2008) transcript available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2008/s2365139.htm. The ABC program also reported 
that staff at Woomera was not adequately trained for the tasks that awaited them, and some of 
the persons hired were generally unsuitable for their jobs. Id. 
 148. B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [11-12]. 
 149. Four Corners: . . .About Woomera, supra note 146.  
 150. In January 2002, it was noted that 44 inmates had sewn their lips together; refugees 
had drunk shampoo and had tried to hang themselves with bed sheets. Barkham, supra note 
145. See also B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [91]. It appears that some of the guards 
too, attempted suicide. Four Corners: The Guards’ Story, supra note 147. 
 151. B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [11-12]. 
 152. Id. ¶ 7. 
 153. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. 
 154. Law Report: Scope of Duty to Provide Diplomatic Asylum, THE INDEPENDENT, 
Nov. 10, 2004. 
 155. B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [17]. 
 156. Id. ¶ 22. 
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human rights instruments that the sending state has ratified. Article 1 of the 
ECHR contains the general obligation of every contracting state to “secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms of that 
convention; it does not, therefore, expressly limit its applicability to the 
territory of the relevant state. The equivalent phrase in the ICCPR refers to 
“all individuals within” the state’s “territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction;”157 whereas the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) refers only to the “jurisdiction” of the relevant state.158 
It is true that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, on 
several occasions, employed an interpretation that underlined the primacy of 
a territorial application of the convention.159 On the other hand, an 
extraterritorial reach has been suggested to the court (and commission) in a 
variety of cases, ranging from situations in which a specific territory,160 
vessel,161 or prison162 was under the control of a contracting state to 
scenarios in which jurisdiction was alleged on the basis of military activities 
adopted by the relevant state abroad.163 In some cases, the court has indeed 
accepted the suggestion of extraterritorial jurisdiction,164 and similar 
findings have been made by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to the ICCPR165 
and the ACHR,166 respectively.167 
 
 157. ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 2(1). 
 158. ACHR, supra note 102, art. 1(1). 
 159. See, e.g., Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶ 72; Medvedyev v. France, 
App. No. 3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, ¶ 63 (2010); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 26, ¶ 86 (1989). For a similiar approach to the ACHR, see Alejandre v. 
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104, doc. 10 
¶ 23 (1999). 
 160. See Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (2004), 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, ¶ 63 (2005); 
Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, ¶ 71. 
 161. Jamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶ 67. 
 162. Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 
(1975). 
 163. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345, 348-49, 356, ¶¶ 30, 46-49, 74. 
 164. See Jamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶ 72 (limiting such jurisdiction to 
“exceptional cases”); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 62 (1995) (“not 
restricted to the national territory”); Medvedyev, App. No. 3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, ¶ 64 
(2010).  Extraterritorial jurisdiction has for instance been accepted in cases where authorities 
of the contracting State carried out “executive or judicial functions” abroad. Al-Skeini v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, ¶ 135 (2011). It has also been 
recognized in cases of vessels registered in, flying the flag of or being under exclusive control 
of such a State. See Jamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶¶ 73, 75; Medvedyev, App. No. 
3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, ¶ 67. It has also been recognized in cases in which a 
contracting State has effective control over an area outside its lawful territory. Loizidou, 310 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 62 (1995). 
 165. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the Legal 
Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]. 
 166. See Saldaño v. Argentina, Petition, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, ¶ 17 (1999); Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
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It has always been much more difficult to state precisely which grounds 
trigger the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a contracting state. The question for 
instance whether activities by military forces of the relevant state that did 
not lead to occupation of the territory, can provide grounds for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, has given rise to particular controversy.168 In 
light of this, it is remarkable that even Chambers, which otherwise adopt a 
restrictive line on extraterritorial jurisdiction, agree that acts of diplomatic 
and consular agents are at any rate capable of engaging the jurisdiction of 
the contracting state.169 
In principle, therefore, a ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
human rights law might exist if the consular officers of a state—as in the 
case of the Bakhtiari brothers—decide to hand over refugees to the 
authorities of the receiving state.170 
In another case concerning extraterritorial asylum, the European 
Commission of Human Rights was quite explicit on the question of 
jurisdiction. In September 1988, a group of eighteen citizens of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) turned up at the Danish embassy in (East) 
Berlin and requested that negotiations be conducted to allow them to leave 
 
Report No. 86/99, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104, doc. 10 ¶ 23 (1999). 
 167. The opinion of the HRC is of particular interest, as a literal reading of the ICCPR 
would allow the conclusion that the terms “territory” and “jurisdiction” in article 2 are 
cumulative requirements. The HRC adopted a more generous construction and did not 
consider that article to prevent investigations into allegations that acts committed “on foreign 
soil” violated the conventional obligations of a State party. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1987, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), ¶¶ 12.1-
12.3 (1981). See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Wall Opinion), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 111 (July 9). But 
see Burgos (separate opinion of Tomuschat, C.). For a similar finding by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter Inter-Am Commission) regarding the ACHR, see 
Saldaño, Petition, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.9517, ¶ 17 
(1999); Alejandre, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, 
OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104, ¶¶ 23, 24 (1999). 
 168. It has sparked different assessments by various human rights bodies. See General 
Comment 31, supra note 165; Alejandre, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
86/99, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104, ¶ 25. But see Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345, ¶ 82. But it 
has also led to divergent case law even within the ECtHR itself. See R (Al-Skeini and Others) 
v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609 [192] (Lord Sedley) (U.K.); Al-Skeini v. 
Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26 [67] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry) (Appeal taken from 
Court of Appeal) (U.K.).  
 169. See Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345, ¶ 73. See also Medvedyev, App. No. 
3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, ¶ 65; Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, ¶ 134; Jamaa, 2012-II 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶ 75. Cf. Saldaño, Petition, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.9517, ¶ 20 (1999) (for the ACHR system). 
 170. Newspaper reports stated that the boys were “taken to a detention centre by more 
than a dozen Australian federal police officers” on the evening of July, 18. Matthew Brace, 
British Diplomats Turn Away Boys Claiming Asylum, THE TIMES, July 19, 2002. The fact that 
the potential violations of rights guaranteed under the ECHR would not have been performed 
by the agents of the sending State, but by agents of the receiving State, does not change the 
material assessment of this situation. See infra text accompanying note 177. 
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East German territory.171 The Danish ambassador eventually called in the 
GDR police, who led the refugees away. The subsequent treatment of the 
refugees included periods of detention, the temporary removal of their 
children, and, reportedly, long periods of interrogation.172 Before the 
European Commission of Human Rights (in the case of WM v Denmark), 
the applicant claimed, inter alia, that his right to liberty and security of the 
person (Article 5 of the ECHR) had been violated when he was transferred 
to police custody. The Commission declared itself “satisfied that the acts of 
the Danish ambassador complained of affected persons within the 
jurisdiction of the Danish authorities within the meaning of Article 1 (Art. 
1) of the Convention.”173 
In the Bakhtiari case, the Court of Appeal took a similar view and found 
that, “while in the consulate, the applicants were sufficiently within the 
authority of the consular staff to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom for the purpose of article 1.”174 
However, it also seems quite clear from the judgment that mere 
presence in the consulate was not a sufficient basis for this finding. There 
had to be more than that—what was required, was at least some act of 
assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the officials. The court referred in 
that context to the fact that the applicants were assured of their safety while 
they were on the premises and that they were brought from the reception 
area into the “office” area of the consulate.175 It is possible to read the 
decision in WM v Denmark in a similar light; in that situation, acts of the 
officials were involved when they initially allowed the refugees to stay in 
the embassy while they were carrying out negotiations with authorities of 
the receiving state.176 
This, indeed, must be the right approach towards establishment of 
jurisdiction by diplomatic and consular officials. It is consistent with the 
foundations on which extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction has been 
accepted in other circumstances: whatever the nature of the ground—be it 
authority over occupied territory, control over a vessel, or the running of a 
prison on foreign soil—it appears that a voluntary act on the side of the 
relevant state had always contributed to the establishment of jurisdiction. 
What is more, it would be quite difficult to adduce sufficient evidence to the 
effect that in the absence of any conduct by the State—for instance, in 
scenarios in which a diplomatic mission is overrun by refugees—customary 
international law allocates jurisdiction to an unwilling state. 
That acts by diplomatic agents (and consular officers) can establish 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, does not mean that they will do so in all 
circumstances. The question in particular has arisen whether the (threatened) 
violation of just about any human right can trigger jurisdiction of this kind. 
It is a difficult point, the more so as the diplomatic officials will not 
have carried out the human rights violation themselves, but have “merely” 
made such violations possible, through the surrender of the refugee. The 
analogy to extradition appears apt.177 In situations where the person to be 
extradited faced human rights abuses in the requesting state, the ECtHR 
declared that the “liability” of the extraditing state is incurred “by reason of 
its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an 
individual to proscribed ill-treatment.”178 But the court also found that the 
extraditing state does not have to be “satisfied that the conditions [. . .] in the 
country of destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the 
Convention.”179 In a recent judgment, the ECtHR confirmed that in 
situations where a state exercises control over individuals through agents 
operating abroad, only rights “that are relevant to the situation” need to be 
secured, and that Convention rights therefore can be “divided and 
tailored.”180 
Apart from more fundamental concerns attaching to a pick and mix 
approach to human rights, this statement fails to provide guidance on the 
obvious question as to which rights are fortunate enough to survive when a 
state exercises jurisdiction abroad. Human rights bodies have struggled with 
this problem. 
There appears to be some agreement that genuine threats to the right to 
life and freedom from torture would involve the jurisdiction of the 
contracting state.181 In the Bakhtiari case, the Court of Appeal went in a 
similar direction, but not in a consistent fashion. When discussing the 
applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights, the court first 
accepted that the granting of diplomatic asylum was possible if the fugitive 
faced the “risk of death or injury as the result of lawless disorder,” but shied 
away from phrasing this as a duty arising from extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.182 In the next paragraph, it appeared to accept such a duty in 
cases where the “immediate likelihood of experiencing serious injury” 
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necessitated such protection,183 but no longer mentioned situations where a 
risk of death existed. 
Outside the right to life and freedom from torture, the controversy is 
even more pronounced. In the case of the former East German citizen who 
had found refuge in the Danish embassy, the European Commission of 
Human Rights did not, in the end, find that Denmark had deprived the 
applicant of his right to liberty or security of the person. The Commission 
considered the treatment, which the applicant received by the GDR 
authorities, as being not “so exceptional as to engage the responsibility of 
Denmark”—but provided no authority for this secondary status of the rights 
whose violation was alleged.184 
In the Bakhtiari case, the Court of Appeal likewise rejected the view 
that there was a requirement under human rights law to grant diplomatic 
asylum to persons outside situations in which they faced serious injury185 
and specifically stated that a “threat of indefinite detention” was not enough 
to “justify [. . .] or require” such a grant.186 It too, did not provide any 
authority for this exclusion. 
The Court of Appeal also suggested a further approach, which is 
missing in the findings of the European Commission of Human Rights. In 
the eyes of the judges, international law must “permit” the granting of 
asylum if it was clear that the receiving state intended to subject the refugee 
“to treatment so harsh as to constitute a crime against humanity.”187 
It is a strange position. Crimes against humanity come in many hues, 
and some of them can have less grievous consequences for the individual 
victim than certain “ordinary” violations of human rights.188 Even “severe 
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deprivation[s] of physical liberty” can form the basis for crimes against 
humanity,189 bringing the alleged ground for diplomatic asylum very close 
to human rights violations whose inclusion the Court of Appeal had 
endeavored to avoid. 
In this context, too, the court remains its own authority. Given the 
relatively novel understanding of crimes against humanity as a basis for 
asylum, it is difficult to dispel the impression that the judges were keen to 
climb on the bandwagon of international criminal justice. If that had been 
the intention, they did not manage to get entirely on board. It is a strange 
proposition that crimes against humanity, but not war crimes and genocide, 
should form a basis of asylum. 
Nor does the judgment provide sufficient clarity for other violations of 
human rights: in areas where a “lesser level of threatened harm” (than that 
threatened through crimes against humanity) was concerned, the court 
contented itself with stating that the law was “ill-defined.”190 
The fact remains that none of the relevant provisions of the leading 
human rights instruments—neither Article 1 of the ECHR, nor Article 2 of 
the ICCPR, nor Article 1 of the ACHR—differentiates between various 
forms of jurisdiction or allows for the wholesale exclusion of certain human 
rights if particular forms of jurisdiction are involved. The basic premise 
remains that, once jurisdiction has been established, the whole range of 
human rights guaranteed under these instruments becomes applicable and 
imposes obligations on the contracting state. 
Restrictions do exist. But the reason for their existence is that the 
obligation of the contracting state under human rights law is not the only 
interest in this field; the interests of the receiving state, to which reference 
has been made above, yet survive. If an assessment of the meeting of the 
divergent norms leads to the result that the interests of the receiving state 
weigh heavier in the scales, the rights that the mission seeks to protect may 
experience a limitation, and the evaluation may even lead to the result that, 
given the circumstances of the situation, a right to grant diplomatic asylum 
did not exist. 
The identification of mechanisms that allow the performance of such an 
assessment will constitute the principal part of the following Section. It is 
based on the view that objective parameters for the evaluation of the 
lawfulness of the diplomatic decision do exist, and that a reflection of the 
positions taken by judicial authorities, sending and receiving states, and 
commentators in this field can yield more precise guidance on the matter. 
The result is the establishment of certain principles, which allow an 
understanding of the diplomatic decision in light of the values involved and 
the relevant threat to which they are exposed. 
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III. BETWEEN AYES AND NAYS: WHERE THE RIGHT WAY LIES 
The impact that divergent norms exercise on the grant of diplomatic 
asylum appears to have been recognized by courts and commentators only 
in the relatively recent past. But when the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi 
reached the European Court of Human Rights (a case concerning the 
transfer of Iraqi prisoners from British custody to the Iraq High Tribunal, 
where they might have faced the death penalty), the court had opportunity to 
reflect, in an obiter dictum, on this aspect of diplomatic asylum. It reached 
the conclusion that there are certain obligations that the sending State owed 
to the receiving State—including the obligation not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the latter—and that these obligations applied in cases in 
which refugees sought asylum in embassies.191 The court did continue to say 
that there may, however, “be other conflicting obligations, for example 
under the Convention [the European Convention on Human Rights].”192 
But it remains a rare phenomenon that this interplay between the norms 
is expressly addressed by observers of diplomatic asylum, and it tends to be 
the actual outcome of their considerations rather than their reasoning that 
allows for conclusions on the paths which they chose to resolve this meeting 
of norms. 
The result of their deliberations can be the adoption of a confrontational 
mechanism, an approach that understands the coinciding of norms as a 
genuine conflict, whose resolution demands the subordination of one set of 
rules to another. But international law also recognizes methods that seek to 
avoid the assumption of a clash (and its potentially destructive 
consequences). There is evidence that both ways have, at some stage, been 
supported in literature and in practice. 
A.  Evaluating the meeting of the norms: a problem of methodology 
A confrontational approach towards the meeting of norms forces a clear 
decision between the competing interests. In the eyes of the supporters of 
this approach, the relevant norms clash, and the clash is resolved by giving 
preference to one norm over the other. Riveles, for example, speaking about 
instances in which threats emanating from a system of apartheid meet with 
the interest of the receiving state in its ability to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction, advocates a solution along confrontational lines: in her view, it 
is the obligation to grant asylum in circumstances of that kind that 
survives.193 It is an opinion that subordinates restrictive norms to permissive 
norms, but does so without inquiring whether the conditions of certain 
situations may allow for variations in the application of this rule. 
The Court of Appeal in Bakhtiari went in the opposite direction. In that 
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case, the court held that the European Convention on Human Rights could 
not call on states to grant consular asylum “if to do so would violate 
international law,”194 and referred in particular to Article 55 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.195 The conclusion it reached was that 
granting asylum would have constituted an abuse of the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises: it would have “infringed the obligations of the United 
Kingdom under public international law.”196 Here too, then, one legal 
system is subordinated to the other; but the reasons for this are far from 
clear. It is, after all, easy enough (and equally unsatisfactory) to reverse the 
reasoning and to demand that the VCCR must not be allowed to infringe 
Britain’s obligations under the ECHR. 
It is true that confrontational mechanisms are, under certain 
circumstances, recognized in international law. Such mechanisms can be 
expressly enshrined in treaties,197 but they may also occupy space in 
customary international law—such as the lex specialis rule (the rule that the 
more specific norm is to be given priority over the more general norm)198 
and the lex posterior rule199 (the rule that the norm that arose later in time is 
to be given priority over the earlier norm). 
But their applicability to the meeting of the rule of non-interference 
with norms deriving from human rights or erga omnes interests is not 
without problems. The reason for that is that confrontational methods of this 
kind often presuppose not only a hierarchy but also a link between the 
relevant norms. Lex posterior and lex specialis in particular are only feasible 
mechanisms if the rules under consideration concern the same subject 
area.200 That is precisely not the case here; the meeting of diplomatic duties 
with the permissive norms outlined above rather provides an illustration for 
the common problem of the existence of special and separate intersecting 
regimes.201 
Nor is it apparent that the applicability of other confrontational 
mechanisms has been advocated. It is in particular worth observing that 
neither courts nor academic commentators tend to base their preference for 
one of the competing interests in this context on the existence of a norm 
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with jus cogens character. One of the reasons may be that it has always been 
difficult to identify norms that belong to this exclusive circle,202 and even if 
the prohibition of a certain human rights violation has been identified as 
carrying jus cogens character, it does not follow that ancillary rules—such 
as the extension of jurisdiction to secure the underlying rights in another 
State—share this status. States as well as international courts and tribunals 
have shown themselves hesitant to expand the jus cogens concept beyond 
the core obligations themselves.203 That and the devastating effects of 
peremptory rules204 have contributed to the ongoing problem of defining the 
boundaries of the concept, and courts have been reluctant to assess a 
meeting of norms on the basis of jus cogens alone.205 
The fact remains that both the ban on diplomatic interference (and of 
the misuse of mission premises) and the divergent norms they encounter, 
represent important strands of international law. The duties of diplomatic 
agents were established in an effort to protect the sovereignty of the 
receiving state; erga omnes rights and human rights obligations on the other 
hand are direct emanations of common interests of the international 
community and the rights of individuals. Given the importance that these 
fields of international law enjoy, there is no apparent reason why they 
should not demand equal validity. 
The approach adopted by the ICJ in the Asylum Case follows a more 
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discerning line than that advanced by supporters of the confrontational 
school. The court appreciated that there may be situations in which the 
“derogation from territorial sovereignty” that diplomatic asylum constituted, 
might be justified, but it demanded that the legal basis for this be established 
in each instance.206 A differentiating approach is also chosen by those states 
that refer to the shape that the protected interest received through the 
conditions of a particular scenario. Austria for instance, in her response to 
General Assembly Resolution 3321 (XXIX) of 1974, found that the granting 
of diplomatic asylum, while constituting a “grave interference with the 
sovereignty of the receiving country” was justifiable if a person was in 
“immediate, serious danger,”207 and the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs similarly accepted a right to asylum if the individual faced “a serious 
and imminent risk of violence.”208 From this perspective, it is not the 
relevant human right on its own, but its particular form in a specific 
situation, that triggers a right to resort to diplomatic decisions of this kind. 
These statements are indications that a more exacting assessment of 
diplomatic asylum requires a mechanism that is capable of comparing the 
relevant interests and which can allocate a weight corresponding to the 
position they occupy in the circumstances of the individual case. And it is 
not only the legal interests whose evaluation is required. The same 
considerations may apply to the measures involved in an effort to protect 
that interest. A decision to grant asylum might, after all, not be the most 
appropriate method to pursue that aim, even if the situation involves an 
immediate risk to a legally recognized right. Other measures might exist and 
might even possess a greater degree of efficiency. 
A mechanism that understands these aspects cannot be derived from 
hierarchical rules. But a reflection of the general principles of international 
law allows the identification of methods whose specific purpose it is to 
provide mediation in situations of this kind. These are conciliatory 
approaches (chief among them, the principle of proportionality) that 
evaluate the co-existence of divergent interests in a way that promotes 
harmonization rather than subordination. The applicability of these 
considerations and of the tests arising from proportionality in particular will 
form the substantial part of the next Section. 
B. Avoiding the conflict, protecting the interests: The way forward 
It is today possible to speak of a tendency within the international 
community—and among international courts and institutions—to prefer 
conciliatory to confrontational methods, where the assessment of a meeting 
of norms is concerned.209 In that regard, the conclusions of the ILC Study 
Group on Fragmentation are illuminating: The group found that “[c]onflicts 
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between rules of international law should be resolved in accordance with the 
principle of harmonization.”210 Yet a reference to “conflicts” in this context 
may be not entirely adequate: harmonization, after all, is based on the 
perspective that a conflict in the true sense of the word can be avoided.211 
And conciliatory methods have sound foundations in international law. 
The ILC considers harmonization a “generally accepted principle” that 
applies where several norms have an impact on the same subject matter and 
demands that the resulting assessment gives rise “to a single set of 
compatible obligations.”212 But it is also possible to understand it as a 
technique of interpretation that takes into account the contents of both 
rules213 and thus avoids the assumption of a normative conflict.214 
As such, it derives support from the practice of international courts215 
and from academic writings.216 But the view that the interpretation of a 
norm must take into account other rules of international law, which have 
relevance for the instant situation, is also embraced by article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT.217 The underlying rationale appears to be that a conciliatory 
approach is possible as long as one way can be found for a state and its 
agents to comply with the conditions that the two rules impose.218 As a 
result, one rule will typically condition the meaning of the other. 
An equally strong case can be made for the applicability of 
proportionality as one of the emanations of a conciliatory approach. 
Proportionality has been well established as one of the general principles to 
which article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute makes reference.219 It fills the gaps 
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of the law220 and provides a default position, which applies unless states 
have specifically opted for a deviating regulation. Its presence has been 
recognized in fields as diverse as trade law and the use of force, human 
rights law and the law of the sea, but also in those instances of diplomatic 
law where the rule of non-interference meets with norms, which permit the 
diplomatic conduct in question.221 
It is more difficult to establish with certainty the constituent elements of 
proportionality. Literature222 and the courts223 suggest various tests as to the 
aspects of the assessment that proportionality requires; but on the basis of 
their common features, it is possible to identify three necessary stages that 
are included in the evaluation: the identification of the relevant interests that 
have an impact on the particular case, the identification of the relevant 
measures that are involved, and the performance of a comparative analysis. 
Where the situation of diplomatic asylum is concerned, this paper has 
already discussed the relevant interests when it referred to the permissive 
and restrictive norms that reflect values that benefit the sending and 
receiving states respectively. But proportionality also requires an assessment 
that takes into account the parameters of the particular situation in which 
rights and obligations are claimed. That includes a reflection on future 
developments, which are foreseeable in the individual case (such as the 
impact that denial of asylum may have on a people whose right to self-
determination will be indirectly affected). 
The relevant measure must show some form of connection to its aim;224 
at the very least, the means employed must, in general, be capable of 
achieving it. If therefore the declared aim of the grant of diplomatic asylum 
is assistance towards the realization of self-determination, while the measure 
in fact protects only the rights of an individual that have no link to that 
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interest, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the necessary connection 
between measure and aim had been present. 
Of the three stages of the examination of proportionality, the last—the 
comparative analysis—is by far the most complex one. There are two 
approaches to this examination that make frequent appearances in case law 
and literature: the test of the “least restrictive means” and that of the “cost-
benefit analysis.” 
The test of the least restrictive means inquires whether, in a given 
situation, alternative measures had been available that would have achieved 
the same objective, but imposed less of a burden on the affected interest.225 
The significance of this test for the assessment of diplomatic asylum is 
apparent from the opinions of courts dealing with that matter, but also from 
the views of members of the international community. Australia noted in her 
submission pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3321 (XXIX) that 
diplomatic asylum had to be the “only resort open to the fugitive.”226 In a 
similar vein, the Court of Appeal in the Bakhtiari case explored the 
available alternatives to the grant of asylum that existed in the specific case. 
It referred to the fact that a hearing on the Bakhtiaris’ refugee status was 
pending in the courts of Australia at the same time at which they requested 
asylum in the consulate227 and pointed out that the receiving state was a 
country which “observe[d] the rule of law.”228 The judges also found it 
“significant” that the High Court of Australia had commented on Australian 
criminal, civil, and administrative law as providing “avenues of redress to 
aliens who alleged that they had suffered mistreatment while in 
detention.”229 
But these arguments highlight one of the dangers that exist if the test of 
the least restrictive means were understood in this sense. Means that are less 
intrusive can often be found, and in the case of diplomatic asylum the 
contention will frequently be raised that the diplomatic mission could have 
refrained from acting altogether and could have left the matter to the local 
authorities. 
There is, however, a corrective mechanism that imposes a cap on calls 
for less intrusive means, which finds wide support in international law,230 
and whose existence is necessary if the test is not to be deprived of all 
significance for the principle of proportionality. According to this 
understanding, alternative measures must be at least of equal efficiency to 
 
 225. R v. Goldstein, [1983] A.C. 151 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Court of Appeal) Lord 
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 227. R v. Secretary of State (B & Others), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [94], [2005] Q.B. 
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achieve the objective that the adopted measure pursues. In the Bakhtiari 
case for instance, the observations made by the Court of Appeal would have 
been more persuasive if the court had not also found that Australian law 
does not “include a right to challenge a failure to secure the enjoyment of 
human rights,” and if it had not pointed out that neither the ICCPR, nor the 
ICESCR nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention 
Relative to the Status of Refugees and its amending Protocol had been 
transformed into Australian domestic law.231 If it had indeed been the 
judges’ view that human rights violations could not be challenged in the 
courts of Australia, it would have been hardly consistent to derive an 
argument against diplomatic asylum from the fact that judicial redress had, 
after all, been available to the applicants. 
The answer to the question whether less intrusive but equally effective 
alternatives existed, will inevitably be shaped by the internal structure of the 
receiving state and both its willingness and ability to secure the rights that 
the grant of diplomatic asylum seeks to protect. It is the nature of the 
relevant interest that allows conclusions on the efficiency of the receiving 
state in this context: if the interest is based on the right to self-determination, 
a state which possesses strong mechanisms for the protection of minority 
rights will find it easier to support the claim that appropriate alternatives to 
asylum exist than would a state that does not. If the interest is based on 
conventional obligations of the sending state to secure human rights, the 
receiving state would have to possess means of guaranteeing the fulfilment 
of human rights violations through its own authorities, if it wishes to claim 
that “effective alternatives” had been in place. 
That does not mean that only a very specific form of government is 
capable of securing the interests that diplomatic asylum seeks to protect. A 
more decisive factor is the question whether past experiences in this field 
suggest that the receiving state is able and willing to work towards the 
protection of these interests. 
When, in 1956, Cardinal Mindszenty sought asylum in the U.S. 
embassy in Budapest, he did so a few days after the Hungarian uprising of 
that year and at a time when Soviet troops were about to crush the 
revolution. Shortly before his appearance at the embassy, Mindszenty had, 
in a radio speech, underlined the concepts of “national independence and 
democracy;”232 and it would be fair to say that the cardinal had come to be 
considered one of the representatives of those Hungarian movements that 
desired a change from communist rule and thus embodied the people’s 
struggle to determine their own political fate. 
If the interest that the American embassy sought to protect is thus 
understood as assistance towards the Hungarian people’s right to self-
 
 231. B and Others, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [90]. 
 232. International Conference and Exhibition on Cardinal József Mindszenty, WEBSITE 
OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, HUNGARY (Sept. 21, 2012, 3:49 PM), 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/international-conference-and-
exhibition-on-cardinal-jozsef-mindszenty. 
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determination, the opinion that there were alternatives, and that Mindszenty 
could have been referred to the authorities of the receiving state or to the 
occupying power, would appear somewhat quixotic. But there was more to 
the case: experiences made in comparable incidents underlined the fact that 
effective alternatives to the granting of asylum were difficult to find. 
Imre Nagy, the reformist Prime Minister who was in office during the 
uprising, had likewise taken refuge in diplomatic premises—together with 
colleagues of his administration, he had sought asylum in the Yugoslav 
embassy in Budapest.233 The new Hungarian government promised Nagy 
safe conduct if he wished to leave the country, yet when he did emerge from 
the embassy, he was arrested (and later executed).234 At least at that stage, it 
must have been clear that recourse to the authorities of the receiving state 
offered a viable alternative neither to an asylum seeker nor to the people 
whose right to self-determination was affected. 
The grant of diplomatic asylum can also be the only effective 
alternative if the receiving state is, in principle, willing and able to protect 
the legitimate interest but is unable to do so in the specific circumstances of 
the relevant situation. It is at that stage that the scenario of a threat of “mob 
violence,” which has been invoked by several commentators on diplomatic 
asylum,235 gains particular significance—not in the shape of an automatic 
right to asylum that would apply in any situation of this kind,236 but as a 
factor that has an impact on the evaluation of the diplomatic measure. If 
general disorder has engulfed the area around mission premises, it is entirely 
possible that diplomatic agents are able to offer a faster, and thus more 
effective, defense than agents of the receiving state. It is situations of this 
kind that underline the fact that the granting of asylum may sometimes be 
the best available method of securing rights that are recognized under 
international law.237 
Emphasis has, on occasion, been placed on the allegedly low level of 
involvement of the sending state in situations in which diplomatic asylum 
has been granted. According to Porcino, asylum represents only a “passive 
infringement,”238 no more than “a limited incursion” into rights of the 
receiving state; the sending state “does not enter the territory of the 
sovereign state uninvited [...] there is no application of force or aggression 
against the territorial state.”239 These are considerations that matter for the 
 
 233. Bola A. Akinterinwa, Nigeria, Cote D'Ivoire Tango over Asylum-seekers, AFRICA 
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evaluation of the diplomatic measure but also for the second test that the 
comparative analysis of proportionality requires: that of the so-called “cost-
benefit analysis”240 (also called “proportionality stricto sensu” or “true 
proportionality”).241 It is a test that calls for a relationship of proportionality 
between the advantage gained (or expected to be gained) and the negative 
effects that the measure generates. 
Cost-benefit analysis is an approach that can again rely on acceptance in 
various fields of international law,242 but there is some doubt as to what 
precisely the sides of the equation should contain. Case law and literature 
sometimes refer to the competing interests themselves.243 But in this 
generalized form, the analysis would re-introduce the concept of a 
hierarchical relationship between norms and, with it, the challenges that 
accompany this approach.244 
What a comparison of costs and benefits really needs to involve, is an 
analysis that considers the way in which the measures in question have 
shaped the affected interests. What is being compared is, on the one hand, 
the negative impact that the measure has on the affected interest and, on the 
other, the benefit that the decision-maker hopes to achieve by adopting the 
measure.245 
The question whether, given this analysis, the benefits outweigh the 
negative impact, cannot be approached through the application of a precise 
mathematical formula.246 But what the examination must include, are factors 
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which have an impact on the interests in the particular situation, including 
the gravity of the danger to which the protected interest is exposed, existing 
urgency that calls for the granting of diplomatic asylum, and the 
irreversibility of the damage that is caused if shelter were not provided. The 
combined weight of aspects like these may indeed tip the scales in favor of 
the measure adopted by the diplomatic agent. 
And yet, Porcino’s understanding of the grant of asylum as a “passive 
infringement” constitutes a generalization. The fact remains that a positive 
act on the side of the sending state exists—in the shape of the decision to 
afford shelter in the first place.247 Porcino does not deny that, yet he stresses 
that this decision is made “only upon the initiative of the refugee.”248 In 
most cases, that will be a valid observation.249 But it should not lead to the 
conclusion that the grant of asylum therefore cannot carry considerable 
weight. 
A recent case of diplomatic asylum—an incident in 2009 involving the 
former president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya—illustrates the problem.250 
Zelaya was removed from office by the military in June 2009, following an 
order by the Honduran Supreme Court to detain him. He then went into 
exile in Costa Rica, where he attacked his ouster as a “coup d’état.” In 
September of that year, Zelaya managed to return to Honduras, where he 
found refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa.251 
The Zelaya incident was one of very few instances in which a state 
requested the ICJ to provide an evaluation of an alleged situation of 
diplomatic interference.252 Honduras’ claim referred, inter alia, to 
propaganda activities for which, in her view, the diplomatic premises had 
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been utilized since Zelaya’s arrival in the embassy.253 At the time, it was 
reported that hundreds of Zelaya’s followers had surrounded the embassy, 
where the former President addressed them with slogans such as 
“Restitution, Fatherland or Death!”254 The government of Honduras 
expressed the fear that Zelaya’s conduct threatened the “peace and internal 
public order of Honduras.”255 It considered the situation serious enough to 
declare a curfew and to use police and military forces to disband the crowd 
in front of the embassy.256 
Incidents of this kind emphasize the serious consequences that can 
emanate from the diplomatic decision to allow private individuals the use of 
embassy premises—consequences, which, in volatile situations, may include 
public disorder and even armed strife within the receiving state. Such impact 
is likely to be grave and may well be irreversible. And yet, if Porcino’s 
considerations are applied, the conduct of the embassy itself, throughout the 
entire development of the situation, could only be described as a “merely 
passive” infringement of the sovereignty of the receiving state. 
It is, beyond that, difficult to align Porcino’s view with the prevailing 
perspective on state responsibility—even if the principal significance of the 
diplomatic conduct in an incident like that involving Manuel Zelaya, were to 
be seen in a diplomatic omission rather than a positive act. The fact, after 
all, must be taken into account that the international community attaches as 
much significance to positive acts by a state as to omissions.257 It is in that 
regard of relevance that the International Law Commission, in its 
consideration of elements of internationally wrongful acts, noted that, in 
principle, “no difference . . . exists between the two.”258 
In the event, there never was an ICJ judgment in the Zelaya case. 
Following elections in Honduras in 2010 and the assumption of office by a 
new president, the state decided to withdraw its application, and the case 
was removed from the court’s list.259 Had it been decided, the prevailing 
norms on diplomatic asylum in Latin America would inevitably have 
formed part of the basis of the court’s findings.260 
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But the incident demonstrates that there are situations in which the 
decision to grant asylum is a measure that has a foreseeable and grave 
impact on affairs of the receiving state. That does not mean that, even in 
these situations, a comparison of available measures and a weighing up of 
cost and benefit cannot lead to a result favorable to the sending state. In the 
Zelaya case, the fact bears observing that the ouster of the President was the 
removal of a democratically elected head of state—an act that raised 
questions about its impact on the Honduran people’s right to determine their 
own political fate and that subsequently met with condemnation by the 
United Nations and the Organization of American States.261 
It is the hallmark of cost-benefit analysis that it offers a consideration of 
the impact of the diplomatic measure both with regard to the protected 
interests and with regard to the effects it generates in the receiving state. If 
the granting of asylum constitutes a significant contribution to the protection 
of a right whose exercise would otherwise be imperiled, it is possible that 
even a powerful impact on the order in the receiving state might be justified. 
In many cases of diplomatic asylum, it is likely that the benefits of the 
measure may indeed outweigh its negative impact in the receiving state. The 
reason for that is not the “passive role” that the sending state plays in 
granting asylum, but the fact that asylum is often adopted as a temporary 
measure only and usually extended to a very limited circle of persons. On 
the other hand, the interests that the diplomatic mission seeks to protect 
often constitute recognized rights that have come under considerable threat. 
An incident arising in June 2008 provides an illustration for this. In that 
month, the former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, 
sought asylum in the Turkish embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Ibrahim had been 
accused by the Malaysian authorities of homosexual conduct (which 
Malaysia criminalized), but there were reasons to suspect a political 
background to the case: Ibrahim was the leader of the Pakatan Rakyat 
opposition at a time when the government had on several occasions 
attempted to stifle opposition movements and rallies.262 The diplomatic 
measure of granting asylum therefore aided not only the individual refugee, 
but assisted the interests that he represented: the right of a people striving 
for the realization of self-determination. The provision of asylum on the 
other hand, was temporary in nature, and it does not appear that it 
occasioned irreversible or even sustained damage to the criminal justice 
system of the receiving state. 
It is true that there may be a tendency to overstate the beneficial 
influence of the granting of diplomatic asylum; it appears, in particular, 
naïve to claim that diplomatic asylum may (by itself) have the potential of 
 
 261. See G.A. Draft Res. U.N. Doc. A/63/L.74 (June 29, 2009), as orally revised in 
GAOR, 93d plen. mtg at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.93, 11-12 (June 30, 2009); Organization 
of American States, Resolution on the Political Crisis in Honduras, OAS Assembly Res. 
AG/Res. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) rev. 1 (July 2, 2009). 
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persuading the territorial state to “mend its ways.”263 A more tangible 
benefit lies in the fact that it draws the attention of the international 
community to a particular situation and can thus, in the long term, create 
sufficient pressure to effect a change of the relevant conditions. 
In cases in which the protected interest is based on the sending state’s 
obligations under human rights law, cost-benefit analysis can lead to a 
distinction between the human rights that are affected. But this is not a 
distinction along the hierarchical lines that judicial authorities have 
sometimes suggested.264 The important issue is not whether the protected 
interests belonged to an exclusive circle of rights—any right to which the 
conventional obligation refers, can be relevant. The decisive question is 
whether the damage that such a right would experience in the absence of the 
diplomatic measure would be serious and irreversible. 
It is true that this will often see the rights to life and freedom from 
torture in a privileged position, since their violation furnishes an obvious 
case for grave and irreparable damage. But that does not mean that the 
protection of other rights can never lead to an assessment in which the 
benefit of their protection would outweigh the costs of the measure. 
It is, for instance, too simple to state, as the Court of Appeal did in 
Bakhtiari, that the threat of indefinite detention could not justify or demand 
the grant of asylum under human rights conventions.265 What is required is a 
more detailed investigation of the harm threatened to the asylum seeker and 
its comparison to the impact of the diplomatic measure. In the particular 
instance of the Bakhtiaris, it would be difficult to ignore medical evidence 
relating to the grave effects that indefinite detention has on detainees in 
general,266 and on children in particular.267 It is clearly not possible to 
consider the restrictions on the asylum seeker’s right to liberty and security 
 
 263. For a different view on the effects of asylum, see Jeffery, supra note 33, at 21 
(noting the ‘salutory outcome’ that the grant of diplomatic asylum may generate in the longer 
term). 
 264. See supra text accompanying note 185 and note 196. 
 265. R v. Secretary of State (B & Others), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [95], [2005] Q.B. 
643 (appeal taken from Q.B.). The court’s finding is particularly unfortunate in view of its 
earlier observation that threatened harm on a “lesser level” than crimes against humanity may 
“justify the assertion of an entitlement under international law to grant diplomatic asylum,” 
and that this was an “ill-defined” area of the law. Id. ¶ 89. 
 266. In a recent report, Physicians for Human Rights referred inter alia to “severe and 
chronic anxiety and dread,” “pathological levels of stress that have damaging effects on the 
core physiologic [sic] functions of the immune and cardiovascular system,” “depression and 
suicide,” “[p]ost-traumatic stress disorder” and “enduring personality changes.” CARA M 
CHEYETTE, PUNISHMENT BEFORE JUSTICE: INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US 2 (Scott Allen 
ed., 2011). 
 267. INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION, Impact of Detention on Children, in 
CAPTURED CHILDHOOD 48 (David Corlett et al eds., 2012), available at 
http://idcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Captured-Childhood-FINAL-June-2012.pdf 
[hereinafter CAPTURED CHILDHOOD]. In the Bahktiari case, the HRC did reach the conclusion 
that a violation of Art. 9(1) ICCPR (the right to liberty and security of person) had come into 
existence. Bakhtiari 2003, supra note 142, ¶ 9.3. 
Spring 2014] The Law of Diplomatic Asylum  
 
as divorced from the impact these restrictions have on other rights. That 
includes the right to family life,268 but also the right to physical and moral 
integrity.269 In the Bakhtiari case, a youth worker dealing with the situation 
noted in early 2002 that she had seen, over the period of one year, a 
“continual decline in the children’s well-being, particularly related to their 
socialization and psychological state.”270 When the Human Rights 
Committee dealt with the case in 2003, it referred to the “traumatic 
experiences” of the Bakhtiari family in “long-term immigration detention” 
(which, in its view, violated the right to liberty and security of person).271 
Damage caused by indefinite detention can have lasting effect and may 
be irreversible.272 Under certain circumstances, detention of children may 
amount to inhuman treatment.273 A finding of this kind was reached by the 
ECtHR in the 2007 Mubilanzila case, which concerned the detention of a 
five-year-old girl in a Belgian Transit Centre as an illegal immigrant.274 
While the young age of the applicant formed part of the court’s 
considerations, conditions at the Centre were described in significantly 
friendlier terms than those at Woomera.275 What the court did take into 
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comforted when showing signs of distress. Id. ¶ 37. She had also been in daily telephone 
contact with her mother or uncle and the court found that “staff and residents at the centre did 
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account was the fact that the child was not accompanied by her parents, had 
been detained in the same conditions as adult asylum seekers, that measures 
had not been taken to guarantee proper counselling and educational 
assistance, and that the detention had lasted for two months.276 
Diplomatic agents might not always have full knowledge of all features 
of the situation in which the asylum seekers would find themselves in the 
absence of diplomatic action. But in the Bakhtiari case, the relevant aspects 
were known at the time.277 Under these circumstances, the consular officers 
had the opportunity, and, given the human rights obligations of the sending 
state, the duty, to perform an appropriate assessment of the threat facing the 
children. Aspects that should have played a role in an evaluation of this kind 
were the conditions at the detention facility, the particularly vulnerable 
position of the asylum seekers (based in part on their age and their past 
traumatic experiences) and the length of their stay at Woomera—which, by 
the time of their escape, had been close to one and a half years. 
In situations in which the potential negative impact on the refugee is as 
well defined as that, it is difficult to see how the benefit of securing their 
human rights could be outweighed by the costs of withdrawing them from a 
system that showed little inclination of welcoming them in the first place. 
An assessment under the principle of proportionality cannot reach any other 
result but that the diplomatic (or consular) officials were entitled to grant 
asylum and, in the circumstances of the case, required to protect the human 
rights that had come under threat. 
CONCLUSION 
The grant of asylum on mission premises constitutes one of the most 
significant and controversial areas in which charges of diplomatic 
interference have been raised. Unlike many other fields that may be 
considered in this context—such as certain lobbying activities, criticism of 
the administration of the receiving state and even the making of threats—the 
impact of the decision to afford asylum is felt immediately and is usually 
accompanied by an inordinate amount of publicity. 
It is true, of course, that it is usually not the diplomats themselves who 
take the first step in situations of this kind, and once a refugee turns up on 
their doorstep, claiming to be in considerable danger, they will often not 
have the luxury of leisurely deliberation before reaching their decision. And 
yet, the grant of asylum involves serious repercussions, both on the political 
 
their best for her.” Id. ¶ 52. 
 276. Id. ¶ 50. 
 277. The Court of Appeal noted that “[b]y 2001 the conditions in which immigrants, and 
especially children, were detained in Woomera [. . .] were giving rise to well publicized 
concern.” R v. Secretary of State (B & Others), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344, [6], [2005] Q.B. 
643 (appeal taken from Q.B.). Moreover, the consular officials also received detailed 
information about the treatment which the Bakhtiaris had received at Woomera, when the 
boys arrived at the consulate. Id. ¶¶ 11−12. 
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and the legal plane, and it is hardly advisable to base a choice of this gravity 
on instinct alone. Even in states known for their oppressive methods, asylum 
is not always a justifiable path, and even in states whose liberal systems are 
widely appreciated, asylum is not always excluded under international law. 
It is suggested that the following principal considerations must be taken into 
account in any situation of this kind. 
First of all, no diplomatic mission can afford to ignore the impact of an 
act by which the embassy assumes jurisdiction over the refugee. There is no 
evidence that the international community forces a sending state to assume 
jurisdiction if its premises are overrun by asylum seekers,278 but once a 
voluntary act of assumption has been performed, the situation changes. And 
such an act can be seemingly innocuous: in the Bakhtiari case, moving the 
refugees from the reception area to the office area sufficed.279 
Quite apart from the political tensions that such an act will almost 
invariably involve, the act also triggers the applicability of certain duties 
under human rights conventions, if the sending state is party to them. It 
bears observing that neither the Court of Appeal in the Bakhtiari case, nor 
the European Commission of Human Rights in WM v Denmark denied the 
existence of such duties; what kindled controversy, was their extent. But the 
emergence of such duties means that the sending state now partakes, to a 
certain degree, in the responsibility to secure the rights of the asylum seeker. 
If these rights are not credibly guaranteed by the territorial state, it may no 
longer be possible to hand over the refugees to the authorities of the latter. 
On a practical level, this means that the mission now has to find ways to 
negotiate a settlement of the situation of asylum with the receiving state. If a 
settlement satisfying the rights of the asylum seeker cannot be reached, the 
mission may have to endure all the difficulties that an unresolved situation 
of this kind involves. That might include surveillance by authorities of the 
receiving state—in the case of Mindszenty for instance, security police 
reportedly continued to take pictures of the cardinal on his walks through 
the courtyard even fourteen years after his asylum had begun280 and other 
impediments to the proper fulfilment of its functions.281 
Secondly, mission premises are still the territory of the receiving state. 
Its sovereignty, while limited, is not removed, and the concomitant rights 
 
 278. On the contrary, a diplomatic mission faced with a situation of this kind can seek 
the assistance of the receiving state in removing the refugees. Under Art. 22(2) VCDR, the 
receiving state has a “special duty” to take “all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the 
mission against any intrusion”. See VCDR, supra note 13, arts. 22(2), 25.  
 279. See supra text accompanying note 175. 
 280. Last, supra note 21. In the case of Assange, police guards remained outside the 
Ecuadorian embassy months after he had been granted asylum. Decca Aitkenhead, Julian 
Assange: The Fugitive, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2012, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/dec/07/julian-assange-fugitive-interview. 
 281. That is not to say that such methods, as far as the receiving state has responsibility 
for them, should invariably be considered lawful. The receiving state is under a continuing 
duty to “accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission.” VCDR, 
supra note 13, art. 25. 
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are recognized by the international community. They are usually recognized 
by the sending state too, and with good reason: inroads into sovereignty are 
not always to the benefit of the state that makes them. Given the reciprocal 
nature of diplomatic relations, such precedents can be expected to be used 
against the sending state itself. 
If the rights of the territorial state are thus a necessary starting point for 
the evaluation of diplomatic asylum, it is also fair to say that even impartial 
observers often find it difficult to look beyond that basic premise. The 
reason for that is that, outside regional arrangements, diplomatic asylum 
remains a poorly codified area of international law. In the absence of 
generally applicable treaty law on the subject, the codified norms showing 
the closest proximity to diplomatic asylum appear to be the VCDR ban on 
interference and the Convention’s prohibition on the misuse of mission 
premises. 
These are considerations that underline the importance of minimizing, 
where possible, the impact of the grant of asylum on legitimate interests of 
the receiving state. They militate in favor of a limitation of diplomatic 
asylum both in view of its temporal and its personal dimension, so that 
refuge will not be afforded beyond the necessary period of time or to a 
greater circle of persons than those who genuinely require shelter. But in its 
impact assessment, the mission will also have to take into account the 
conduct that it allows asylum seekers to adopt while they are guests on their 
premises, as well as the message that even the initial decision to grant 
asylum sends out, especially if such decision can be construed as support for 
the political agenda of the refugee. 
Thirdly, it is essential that diplomatic missions are aware of the wider 
legal context in which the decision to grant asylum is situated. It is only an 
understanding of the normative context that allows the identification of 
legitimate interests on the side of the sending state that may have 
considerable impact on the assessment of the diplomatic decision. 
That presupposes an awareness of rights and obligations that apply to 
that state. But it also requires an understanding of the factual situation—
including an appreciation of the nature of the harm threatening the refugee 
and the probable consequences if asylum is not afforded. 
On the basis of this assessment, the mission will be able to obtain an 
understanding of the rights that correspond to the interests that the refugee 
intends to protect and with that, of the possibility that these rights 
correspond to norms, which support the position of the sending state. Thus, 
threats to the existence of certain human rights can invoke a direct right of 
the sending state to provide help for their protection, if the rights in question 
have attained erga omnes character. In other cases, the sending state will be 
able—and even obliged—to act to safeguard rights, pursuant to its own 
conventional commitments. In other situations again, asylum seekers who 
represent a people whose right to self-determination has been threatened, 
may trigger a right of the sending state to assist in the realization of that 
interest. 
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The fact remains that, despite the establishment of various systems for 
the protection of human rights, the mechanism for their defense in the actual 
case must often appear inadequate to the bearers of these rights. Effective 
protection will, even today, frequently require the assistance of other states. 
However, that puts diplomatic agents around the world in a special 
position, and one that differs increasingly from that envisaged by the 
traditional functions of the diplomatic office. As agents of their states, 
diplomats today play, unavoidably, an active role in rendering assistance 
toward the realization of human rights. 
To peoples and individuals whose rights have come under attack, the 
diplomatic mission of a state that respects these interests fulfills a protective, 
but also highly symbolic role. In a situation of oppression, when all 
legitimate venues of relief within the territorial state have been barred, 
diplomatic missions are the only effective guarantors of the rights under 
threat. They are more than the representations of individual states; they are, 
often enough, the only remnants of the voice of the international 
community. 
